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I. Introduction
“It’s a bad week to have been conducting an extra-marital
affair.”1 The Ashley Madison data breach on August 18, 2015,
achieved nationwide notoriety2 and is just one of many examples
of large-scale data breach that have occurred within the last few
years.3 AshleyMadison.com is an adult dating website that
matches married men and women looking for “casual encounters,
married dating, discreet encounters, and extramarital dating”; its
slogan is, “Life is short. Have an affair.”4 A group of hackers
1. See Zahra Mulroy, Ashley Madison Hack: Cheaters and Victims’
Reactions Are NOT What You Expect, MIRROR (July 22, 2015),
http://www.mirror.co.uk/lifestyle/sex-relationships/ashley-madison-hackcheaters-victims-6112966 (last visited May 12, 2016) (predicting the likely
repercussions of the Ashley Madison data breach and subsequent dissemination
of customer information) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Adrienne LaFrance, What Everybody Googled in 2015, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/12/whateverybody-googled-in-2015/420717/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (reporting “What
is Ashley Madison” as a top 10 Google search in 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Grave Gavilanes, Hackers Access Ashley Madison Site, Data Expose
Online
Cheaters,
PEOPLE
(July
20,
2015,
4:00
PM),
http://www.people.com/article/ashley-madison-site-hack (last visited May 12,
2016) (discussing the release of a statement by Avid Life Media, Inc.—owner of
AshleyMadison.com—confirming unauthorized access by hackers to confidential
customer information) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For
just a few instances of data breaches occurring in October 2015 alone, see Eric
Chabrow, Scottrade Belatedly Learns of Breach, DATA BREACH TODAY (Oct. 2,
2015),
http://www.databreachtoday.com/scottrade-belatedly-learns-breach-a8565 (last visited May 12, 2016) (noting that law enforcement notified
Scottrade—a discount brokerage—of a cyber attack in late September 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mathew J. Schwartz, Experian
Faces Congressional Scrutiny over Breach, DATA BREACH TODAY (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://www.databreachtoday.com/experian-breach-congress-investigates-a-8580
(last visited May 12, 2016) (discussing a recent data breach of Experian—an
online securities trading company) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Karl Thomas, Dow Jones & Company Experiences Data Breach,
WELIVESECURITY
(Oct.
12,
2015,
2:31
PM),
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/10/12/dow-jones-company-experiences-databreach/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (examining the October 12, 2015 data breach
of Dow Jones) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. ASHLEY MADISON, https://www.ashleymadison.com (last visited May 12,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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known as “Impact Team” stole the confidential records and
information of over 37 million Ashley Madison users.5 After a
series of threats demanding that Avid Life Media, Inc.—
AshleyMadison.com’s owner—shut down the website, Impact
Team publicly released the records.6
Data breaches are a part of life in the modern technological
world.7 Compilation of customer data is the norm for large
corporations and small businesses alike.8 As a result, online
hackers have developed sophisticated hacking methods capable of
circumventing complex security systems and acquiring the
sensitive customer information on their data servers.9 Once
stolen, this data—known as personally identifiable information
(PII)—greatly increases the victim’s likelihood of identity theft.10
PII can be any information from customer phone numbers and
home addresses to credit card information, medical information,
and social security numbers.11 Identity thieves use this highly
5. See Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data,
WIRED (Aug. 18, 2015, 5:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/happenedhackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/ (last visited May 12, 2016)
(detailing the public release of the hacked user information) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See id. (“The hackers deflected responsibility for any damages or
repercussions that victims of the breach and data dump may suffer. ‘Find
yourself in here? It was ALM that failed you and lied to you. Prosecute them
and claim damages . . . .’”).
7. See infra note 14 and accompanying text (providing a representative
list of recent large-scale data breaches).
8. See Robert Faturechi, FTC Calls for Curbs on Consumer Data
Collection, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ftcdata-brokers-20140528-story.html (last visited May 12, 2016) (“The FTC found
that data brokers collect and store billions of data points covering nearly all
American consumers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See Matt Johansen, Top 10 Web Hacking Techniques of 2014,
WHITEHAT SEC. (Mar. 19, 2015), https://blog.whitehatsec.com/top-10-webhacking-techniques-of-2014/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (listing over thirty
different data theft techniques used in 2014 alone) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
10. See Tim Chen, Identity Theft: Your Chances of Being a Victim, U.S.
NEWS
(Mar.
23,
2011),
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/mymoney/2011/03/23/identity-theft-your-chances-of-being-a-victim (last visited
May 12, 2016) (noting that, in 2011 alone, 250,854 Americans were victims of
identity theft) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See ARVIND NARAYANAN & VITALY SHMATIKOVV, MYTHS AND FALLACIES OF
“PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION” 1 (2010) (determining PII includes
Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, and financial accounts).
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personal data—particularly social security numbers—to open
false credit cards, gain access to private bank accounts, etc.;
others make a profit selling the PII on the Internet.12
Dozens of large companies—and even the federal
government—became data breach victims over the past decade.13
The most notable commercial data breaches targeted CareFirst
BlueCross BlueShield, J.P. Morgan, Yahoo, Neiman Marcus,
Target, Sony PlayStation and Online Entertainment Networks,
Citigroup, MasterCard, Visa, and Starbucks.14 The Ashley
Madison data breach in particular serves to remind the public
and the legal community of data breaches’ harsh consequences.15
12. See Michael Riley, Stolen Credit Cards Go for $3.50 at Amazon-Like
Online
Bazaar,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
20,
2011,
12:01
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-20/stolen-credit-cards-go-for-350-each-at-online-bazaar-that-mimics-amazon (last visited May 12, 2016)
(reporting that identity thieves steal 8.4 million credit card numbers on average
annually, many of which can be sold at around $3.50 per card) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The information normally includes the
cardholder’s name, address, and credit card security code. Id.
13. See Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1
Million People, Federal Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-ofsecurity-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/
(last visited May 12, 2016) (examining the cyber attack against the federal
government where the personal information of 22 million government employees
was compromised) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See Data Breach Lawsuits and Information, MORGAN & MORGAN,
http://www.forthepeople.com/class-action-lawyers/data-breaches/ (last visited
May 12, 2016) (providing a list of notable data breaches within the past ten
years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Other large-scale
data breaches targeted Premera Blue Cross, UPS Stores, Inc., Lowe’s, eBay,
Kaiser Permanente, Sears Holdings Corp., New York State Electric & Gas Co.,
Valve/Steam, Lincoln Financial Group, Gap, Staples, and Hewlett Packard. Id.
15. See Robin Levinson King, Ashley Madison Customers Complain of
Blackmail
After
Hack,
TORONTO
STAR
(Nov.
18,
2015),
http://www.thestar.com/news/privacy-blog/2015/11/ashley-madison-customerscomplain-of-blackmail-after-hack.html (last visited May 12, 2016) (discussing
the blackmailing of several Ashley Madison customers following the breach) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sara Malm, Two Suicides Are
Linked to Ashley Madison Leak: Texas Police Chief Takes His Own Life Just
Days After His Email Is Leaked in Cheating Website Hack, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 24,
2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3208907/The-Ashley-Madisonsuicide-Texas-police-chief-takes-life-just-days-email-leaked-cheating-websitehack.html (last visited May 12, 2016) (reporting on two suicides allegedly
connected to the Ashley Madison data breach) (on file with Washington and Lee
Law Review); Zetter, supra note 5 (finding that the stolen information contained
names, email addresses, home addresses, amounts paid and the last four digits
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The issue of Article III standing16 for data breach lawsuits is
especially relevant in the Ashley Madison data breach.17 A
plaintiff must suffer an invasion of a legally protected interest to
establish standing; this invasion must be “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent.”18 This presents a
serious issue for victims of data breach; an unknown party
wrongfully accessed their data, thereby increasing their risk of
identity theft, but causing no actual injury to confer standing to
sue.19 Furthermore, courts’ interpretations of what constitutes an
imminent injury are divided, to say the least.20 This presents a
scenario where the parties have not suffered an “actual injury,”21
and, under some courts’ rulings, their increased risk of harm does
not rise to the “imminent” level.22 Yet, they will likely be seeking
a remedy from the service provider for injuries that have not yet
occurred.23

of customer credit cards).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (granting federal courts jurisdiction over
“cases and controversies . . . between citizens of different states”); infra Part II
(discussing the tripartite Article III standing requirements of injury in fact,
causation, and redressability).
17. See infra Part II.B (discussing the relative ease of establishing standing
once leaked information is used against the consumer—as compared to where
the customer has yet to be “injured”).
18. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(establishing fundamental article III standing requirements).
19. See infra Parts III–VI (arguing that a targeted breach increases a
victim’s risk of identity theft to a level that any future harm can be considered
imminent).
20. See infra notes 24–25 (comparing the vastly different outcomes for
similar cases at the district and circuit court levels).
21. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (establishing the “actual injury”
requirement as “indispensible” to a plaintiff’s case).
22. See cases cited infra notes 24–25 (listing data breach class action cases,
many of which the courts rule against plaintiffs who were not yet victims of
identity theft).
23. See David S. Almeida & Mark Eisen, Barbarians at the Gate: Seventh
Circuit Finds Article III Standing for Data Breach Class Actions, LEXOLOGY:
CLASS
ACTION
DEF.
STRATEGY
BLOG
(July
24,
2015),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4fd79797-228b-4930-935111f3145cb1ef (last visited May 12, 2016) (finding that “[t]he overwhelming
majority of courts . . . dismiss data breach actions for the simple reason that
until a consumer suffers actual identity theft, she lacks Article III standing to
sue”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Outcomes are mixed at the federal district court level,24 but
the few circuits to address the issue have traditionally been
24. Compare Maglio v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 2015 IL App (2d)
140782-U, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. June 2, 2015) (dismissing an action where burglars
stole company computers with customer information for failure to show actual
harm because “[t]he increased risk that plaintiffs will be identity theft victims
at some indeterminate point in the future . . . . [D]id not constitute an injury
sufficient to confer standing”), In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup
Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[I]ncreased risk of
harm alone does not constitute an injury in fact. Nor do measures taken to
prevent a future, speculative harm.”), Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. CIV.A. 09-2560,
2010 WL 3719243, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (holding that the plaintiff
lacked standing where an online phishing scam compromised plaintiff’s PII, but
the plaintiff had not yet suffered concrete harm), Amburgy v. Express Scripts,
Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051–53 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (ruling that the risk of
future harm posed by future data theft where the harm may not occur is too
speculative), Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006)
(same), Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc., No. 13–1417, 2013 WL 6823265, at *14 (D.N.J.
Dec. 26, 2013) (relying on Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA and Reilly v. Ceridian
Corp. to conclude that mere loss of data, without misuse, is not “an injury
sufficient to confer standing”), Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F.
Supp. 3d 871, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper compels rejection of Strautins' claim
that an increased risk of identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement for standing.”), Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp.
2d. 646, 660 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (holding that the increased risk of future harm
relying on the occurrence of future criminal actions by independent decisionmakers was not imminent), and In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013) (“The Complaint alleges
Plaintiffs incurred expenses to mitigate an increased risk of identity theft or
fraud, but it does not allege what those expenses are with any specificity. Even
if specific expenses had been alleged, such expenses would not qualify as actual
injuries under Clapper.” (emphasis added)), with In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig.,
66 F. Supp. 3d. 1197, 1212 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (limiting Clapper to its facts and
granting standing on the grounds that the data breach placed plaintiffs in
immediate danger), Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 2:14-CV-06476, 2015 WL
5729241, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015) (finding standing where plaintiff’s bank
account had been fraudulently accessed—representing an actual injury), In re
Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014)
(finding plaintiffs to have standing where their credit cards were used to make
unauthorized purchases), In re Zappos.com, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00325-RCJ, 2013
WL 4830497, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013) (finding standing where the plaintiffs
suffered “actual fraud or identity theft”), Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No.
5:08–CV–00205–R, 2012 WL 2873892, at *5 (W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012) (finding
that the plaintiffs suffered an injury-in-fact because they were required to
expend time and money to protect their identity), and Moyer v. Michaels Stores,
Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014)
(distinguishing Clapper, “conclud[ing] that the elevated risk of identity theft
stemming from the data breach at Michaels is sufficiently imminent to give
Plaintiffs standing”). “This conclusion follows from Pisciotta and is consistent
with a host of Supreme Court decisions finding standing based on an imminent
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favorable to plaintiffs.25 More recently, however, district courts
interpret Clapper v. Amnesty International USA26—a non-data
breach Supreme Court case published in 2013—to foreclose the
use of imminent injury in data breach lawsuits, trumping the
plaintiff-friendly circuit opinions.27 The majority of post-Clapper
district court cases applied Clapper—incorrectly—to dismiss
imminent injury claims for lack of standing.28 These courts
focused on the “injury” prong, reasoning that, if a plaintiff’s
future injury relies on speculation, then it is not certainly
impending and, therefore, it fails the imminent injury
requirement.29
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Remijas
v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC,30 however, broke this district
court trend and found standing in a data breach action despite
the Supreme Court’s Clapper decision, finding that Clapper did
risk of future injury.” Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *6.
25. Compare Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.
2007) (concluding that “the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a
threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing
the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the
defendants actions” (emphasis added)), and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628
F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that faced “a credible threat of harm”
that was “both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical” (internal
citations omitted)), with Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008)
(denying standing for plaintiff’s claims of harm from future identity theft on the
grounds that they were hypothetical and conjectural), and Reilly v. Ceridian
Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding no injury-in-fact where the
plaintiff’'s PII was accessed but not yet misused).
26. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
27. See id. at 1147 (denying standing for plaintiffs on the grounds that,
because a speculative chain of events had to occur for the plaintiffs to be injured,
the injury was not imminent). Clapper is the seminal case courts use to address
whether an “uninjured” plaintiff suing for damages has standing resulting—
many courts have followed the Clapper Court’s reasoning in denying standing.
See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing cases denying standing in light of Clapper
even though Clapper was not a data breach case).
28. See infra Part III.C (critiquing a few notable district court
interpretations of Clapper).
29. See Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d. at 654–55 (interpreting Clapper as a
barrier for data breach plaintiffs who have yet to suffer an actual injury (citing
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143)). Speculation is inherent in any imminence theory
and courts have incorrectly interpreted Clapper to disallow any speculation and
heighten standing requirements altogether. See infra Part V.A.2 (arguing that
even the certainly impending standard allows a degree of speculation).
30. 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
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not change the law on standing.31 In light of this recent circuit
split, this Note examines whether plaintiffs in data breach
lawsuits can raise the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas to
argue standing even without suffering an actual injury.32
Specifically, it asks whether standing for data breach lawsuits
can survive on imminent injury alone after Clapper.33
Part II of this Note provides a brief history and discussion of
standing.34 This discussion establishes the fundamental elements
of standing a plaintiff must satisfy for her claim to be heard in
court.35 It focuses on the injury-in-fact prong, but the issue
warrants a brief discussion of the causation and redressability
elements as well.36 Part II further discusses the standing issues
that data breach plaintiffs face;37 it describes how courts consider
claims of actual harms, future harms, and mitigation costs in
determining standing.38 Part III provides a selective discussion of
the current state of data breach standing case law.39 This
31. See id. at 693 (holding that plaintiffs in a data breach involving
Neiman Marcus “should not have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or
credit-card fraud to give the class standing, because there is an ‘objectively
reasonable likelihood’ that such an injury will occur” (citing Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1338, 1147 (2013)). For an article discussing the Seventh
Circuit’s denial of an en banc review for Remijas, see Mao Shiokura, 7th Cir:
Neiman Marcus Data Breach Injuries Sufficient for Article III Standing, IMPACT
LITIG. J. (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.impactlitigation.com/2015/09/23/7th-cirneiman-marcus-data-breach-injuries-sufficient-for-article-iii-standing/
(last
visited May 12, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. See infra Part V (positing that Remijas properly limits Clapper to its
facts, rendering it inapplicable in data breach context).
33. See infra Part V (defending the Remijas and Adobe courts’
interpretation of Clapper).
34. See infra Part II (setting forth requirements for Article III standing and
discussing their respective relevance with regard to data breach).
35. See infra Part II (discussing the actual or imminent injury, traceability,
and causation requirements of Article III standing).
36. See infra Part II (noting that, even if a plaintiff establishes an injury,
the injury must be “fairly traceable” to the defendants actions and a favorable
court ruling must be capable of providing a remedy for the alleged harms).
37. See infra Part III (requiring data breach victims, who yet to have their
information misused, to establish that any future harms are so imminent as to
prove an almost inevitable likelihood of them occurring).
38. See infra Part III (discussing the difficulties facing data breach
plaintiffs who have yet to suffer actual harms—such as fraudulent credit card
transactions).
39. See infra Part IV (analyzing the material factual distinctions between
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discussion includes pre-Clapper circuit court cases ruling for and
against standing. Pre-Clapper case law is particularly relevant
because, this Note argues, Clapper did not change the law and
the pre-Clapper standards still apply.40 Part III also discusses
Clapper as well as the cases that interpret it to foreclose future
injury claims in data breach cases.41 At the same time, Part III
introduces the cases that correctly apply Clapper and take it for
what it is; a non-data breach case with minimal to no effects on
standing law.42 Most importantly, Part IV introduces Remijas—
the first post-Clapper circuit court to consider imminent injury in
data breach lawsuits.43
Finally, Part V argues that Clapper should be limited to its
facts and applied only to cases where a chain of events is truly
speculative and, therefore, not sufficiently imminent.44 But,
Clapper does not apply where a data-breach directly jeopardizes
personal customer information and no additional steps are
required for identity thieves to use the data against the victims.45
Part V argues that the increased risk of identity theft is not
“possible”46 when hackers have direct access to the personal
information; rather, it is “imminent.”47 Identity theft is
sufficiently imminent to be considered “certainly impending”

cases in which standing was granted and when standing was denied).
40. See infra Part III.A (discussing pre-Clapper circuit court precedent).
41. See infra Parts III.B–C (analyzing Clapper and discussing the lower
courts’ reasoning for applying it broadly).
42. See infra Part III.D (citing cases that limit Clapper to its facts).
43. See infra Part IV (setting forth and distinguishing federal and circuit
courts’ reasoning for granting standing in light of Clapper).
44. See infra Part V (arguing that, while Clapper’s holding was proper in
light of the facts, the Supreme Court did not intend to tighten the current
standard for standing).
45. The Remijas court employed similar reasoning. See Remijas v. Neiman
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that, once data
thieves obtained unencrypted customer data, the breach created a “substantial
risk” of future identity theft).
46. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013)
(denying standing where plaintiffs argument relied merely on possible
government actions unknown to the plaintiffs).
47. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 156–60 (1990) (establishing
the requirement that an injury must be “certainly impending” to create an
imminent injury sufficient to confer standing).
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when hackers have unfettered access to data.48 This Note argues
that once PII is stolen and readily accessible, there is a cognizable
imminent injury. At that point, identity theft is no longer a
question of “if,” but rather, a question of “when.”
II. Constitutional Standing
A. Fundamental Principles
“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper
role in our system of government than the constitutional
limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases and
controversies.”49 Standing is based on the fundamental principle
of separation of powers and is designed to prevent the judicial
branch from usurping the powers of other political branches.50 In
the context of government action, if a court were to accept any
case on mere speculation or generalized grievances, it would be
unrightfully asserting its decisionmaking power in a field
specifically reserved to the Legislative or Executive Branches.51
48. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1141 (finding that plaintiffs’ injuries were too
speculative to be considered imminent because a series of five events needed to
occur before plaintiffs were actually injured).
49. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (denying
standing for plaintiff taxpayers alleging a decrease in city tax funds where an
automobile manufacturer was given a tax credit, and thus, sustaining an injury
city residents). This case exemplifies the importance of standing acting as a
filter, protecting the courts and government entities from generalized
grievances; in this case, taxpayer complaints. Id. at 348.
50. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1138 (using this foundational principle of
standing to apply a rigorous standard of review to the particular set of facts
presented before the court); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188
(1974) (“Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion
of judicial power.”).
51. The Court shows its hesitance to confer standing—particularly where a
plaintiff challenges a government statute or action—where the harm is
speculative. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176–77 (finding that plaintiff’s
lack of access to CIA spending records and his resulting inability to “properly
fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate” was a generalized grievance
and insufficient to be considered an injury-in-fact); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974) (reaffirming the principle that
standing cannot be predicated on an interest “which is held in common by all
members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury
all citizens share”); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (denying standing
for plaintiffs—who argued that military program permitting surveillance of
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This foundational principle mandating judicial wariness of
speculative harms present one of the largest hurdles for data
breach plaintiffs.52
To successfully bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must
satisfy general Article III standing requirements.53 The burden is
on the plaintiff54 to show: (1) that he has “suffered an ‘injury in
fact,” i.e. “an invasion of a legally protected interested which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’”;55 (2) a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of—“the injury has to be
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not
the result of the independent action of some third party not
before the court”; and (3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.’”56 Each of the elements must be proven “with the
manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages
of the litigation.”57 In the pleading stage, a court presumes the
existence of the specific facts upon which a plaintiff’s general
factual allegations of injury rely.58 To survive a summary
judgment motion, a plaintiff must prove injury by pointing to
specific facts.59 In the class action context, plaintiffs representing
lawful and peaceful activity chilled the freedom of speech—because they did not
present a threat of specific future harm or present objective harm); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (noting that the nonjusticiability of “political
questions” stems from the separation-of-powers principle).
52. See infra Part III.A (discussing cases where courts incorrectly apply
this principle to deny standing even where speculation is minimal).
53. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013)
(“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to certain
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”). Standing is “one element of the case-orcontroversy requirement.” Id.
54. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (requiring
all plaintiffs seeking federal jurisdiction to establish all three elements of
standing).
55. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (denying standing
where plaintiff alleged an imminent injury stemming from a new police
chokehold technique).
56. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
57. Id. at 561.
58. See id. (requiring courts to presume the existence of specific facts upon
which a plaintiff’s claim of injury relies in the pleading stage).
59. See id. (discussing the heightened burden of proof on plaintiffs at the
summary judgment stage).
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a class must show that they themselves have been personally
injured; showing an injury to other members of the class is
insufficient to confer standing for the named plaintiffs.60
B. Actual and Imminent Harm
An actual injury easily satisfies the injury-in-fact prong.61 An
imminent injury will occur in the future; the only question is,
“how soon?” To establish standing, an injury-in-fact must be
“‘distinct and palpable’62 as opposed to ‘abstract.’”63A plaintiff can
easily establish the injury-in-fact prong by pointing to an actual
injury.64 For example, the court in Enslin v. Coca-Cola Company65
found that the plaintiff established a distinct and palpable actual
harm by showing unauthorized credit card use, fraudulent
withdrawals from bank accounts, and unauthorized issuances of
credit cards after a series of laptop thefts.66 Similarly, in In re
Target Corporation Data Security Breach Litigation,67 the court

60. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (noting that plaintiffs
cannot sue on behalf of a class if they themselves have not suffered an actual or
imminent injury).
61. See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 2:14-CV-06476, 2015 WL 5729241, at
*14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015) (granting standing where plaintiffs suffered actual
injuries stemming from laptop theft (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
155 (1990))).
62. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (denying standing where
plaintiffs sued a town for denying residence to low and moderate income
individuals, finding that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that their immediate
interests would be harmed without a favorable ruling).
63. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (denying standing
where plaintiffs alleged that racially discriminatory administration of the civil
justice system deprived them of their constitutional rights, finding any future
injury too abstract). O’Shea established the “real and immediate” standard that
Krottner later uses to confer standing for imminent injury. Id. at 494.
64. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (noting
that for actual injuries, “the existence of standing is clear, though the precise
extent of harm remains to be determined at trial”).
65. 2015 WL 5729241.
66. See id. at *6 (distinguishing plaintiff’s injuries from cases where the
plaintiff had yet to be injured by a data breach). The stolen laptops contained
the plaintiff’s PII in an unencrypted state. Id.
67. 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014).
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granted standing where plaintiffs were subjected to fraudulent
transactions on their credit cards.68
Imminent injuries are far less clear and are the source of
myriad standing disputes in the data breach context.69 To
establish an “imminent” injury, there must be either a
“substantial risk”70 of future injury or the harm must be
“certainly impending.”71 The two standards are not
interchangeable and may possibly lead to different outcomes.72
For example, the Court in Whitmore v. Arkansas73 found that
possible future injury is insufficient to confer standing; rather,
the harm must be certainly impending.74 In Whitmore, a plaintiff
attempted to sue on behalf of a fellow inmate, arguing that the
inmate’s sentence could adversely affect his own sentencing.75
The court denied standing, finding that any future injury was not
certainly impending, given the difference of the inmates’

68. See id. at 1159 (conferring standing after a corporate server containing
customer credit cards was breached and customers faced fraudulent
transactions on their respective credit cards).
69. See cases cited supra notes 24–25 (listing relevant data breach law
suits considering both actual and imminent harm).
70. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–54 (2010)
(finding that plaintiff alfalfa farmers established a “reasonable probability” that
their organic alfalfa crops would be infected with an engineered gene—Roundup
Ready Alfalfa—if it were completely deregulated). In Monsanto, the Court found
a substantial risk of imminent harm because plaintiffs would, for example, be
forced to continually test their organic alfalfa for contamination. See id. at 154
(finding that the resulting mitigation measures would create an irreparable
harm justifying injunctive relief).
71. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (establishing that
a threatened injury must be “certainly impending” and “allegations of possible
future injury” are not sufficient).
72. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013)
(suggesting that the “substantial risk” standard set forth by Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms is separate, distinct, and a lower threshold than the
“certainly impending” standard set forth by Whitmore v. Arkansas).
73. 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
74. See id. at 158 (“A threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to
constitute an injury in fact.” (citing Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979))).
75. See id. at 159–60 (finding plaintiffs argument—that the inmates
sentencing would immediately impact his own sentencing under Arkansas’
comparative review in death penalty cases—unpersuasive, concluding that any
future injury was not certainly impending).
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respective crimes.76 The Court in Blum v. Yaretski77 granted
standing where a threat was “sufficiently substantial.”78 In
Monsanto Company v. Geertson Seed Farms,79 the Court granted
standing where there was a “substantial risk” of future harm.80
III. The Status of Data Breach Case Law
Before Clapper, there was well-established case law
regarding imminent injury in data breach lawsuits.81 This Note
argues that Clapper does nothing to alter them.82 The cases
finding standing all implicitly focus on an unauthorized third
party gaining access to unencrypted PII. The pre-Clapper cases
suggest that a successfully carried out cyber-attack on a data
network establishes a certainly impending injury.83
A. The Circuits’ Slippery Slope
On August 23, 2007, the Seventh Circuit in Pisciotta v. Old
National Bancorp84 established what is likely the most lenient
injury-in-fact requirement for standing in the data breach
context.85 The court found that a plaintiff must only show that
defendants created an increased risk of future harm to establish

76. See id. at 157 (determining that a court’s sentencing of a mass
murderer was not similar enough to a robbery-murder for any injury to be
certainly impending).
77. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
78. See id. at 1000. The Court conferred standing where plaintiff—a
member of a nursing home—faced the possibility of being transferred to a lower
level of care. Id.
79. 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
80. See supra note 70 (discussing Monsanto).
81. See infra Part III.A (analyzing circuit court precedent that tends to lean
in favor of data breach victims arguing imminent injury).
82. See infra Part V (arguing that the Krottner and Pisciotta standards
remain forceful in light of a properly interpreted Clapper).
83. See infra Part V (arguing that this is the correct outcome).
84. 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
85. See id. at 632 (granting standing in a “sophisticated, intentional and
malicious” intrusion by hackers to Old National Bancorp’s website).
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standing.86 In Pisciotta, defendant Old National Bancorp (ONB)
ran a website where individuals applied for ONB’s banking
services.87 Plaintiffs accessed the website in 2002 and 2004,
respectively, providing various forms of PII.88 In 2005, ONB’s
website hosting facility experienced a security breach that the
court labeled as “sophisticated, intentional and malicious.”89
The plaintiff’s theory for standing relied on credit monitoring
expenses incurred and similar future expenses resulting from the
breach.90 The plaintiffs did not, however, “allege any completed
direct financial loss to their accounts.”91 The court was not
persuaded by the more restrictive standing requirements district
courts’ followed in similar data breach contexts.92 Rather, the
court analogized this suit to toxic tort and medical malpractice
86. See id. at 634 (overturning the district court’s dismissal for lack of
standing).
87. Id. at 631.
88. See id. (“[S]ome forms require the customer or potential customer’s
name, address, social security number, driver’s license number, date of birth,
mother’s maiden name and credit card or other financial account numbers.”).
89. Id. at 632. It appears that the court attempted to use this as a factor to
distinguish the present case from prior district court precedent denying
standing. See infra note 92 (discussing cases denying standing where customer
PII was misplaced or inadvertently stolen).
90. See id. at 631 (“[Plaintiffs] requested compensation for past and future
credit monitoring services that they have obtained in response to the
compromise of their personal data through ONB's website.”).
91. See id. (stating that plaintiffs only needed to show an increase risk of
injury, and the fact that the breach might cause greater harm in the future does
“not affect the standing inquiry”).
92. See Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7–8
(D.D.C. 2007) (denying standing where plaintiffs did not suffer actual harm
from identity theft after an ING employee’s personal laptop containing their PII
was stolen in a home burglary). The court denied standing because plaintiffs did
not allege that the laptop was stolen to access their PII or that their PII was
even accessed. Id. The court determined that the injuries were founded on
speculation and, therefore, insufficient to establish an imminent injury. Id.; see
also Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC., No. 06-476 JBS, 2006 WL 2177036, at
*12 (D. N.J. July 31, 2006) (denying standing where a printed list containing
plaintiff’s PII was lost during shipping but did not result in harm to the
plaintiff). The court denied standing because plaintiff failed to allege: (1) That
the purpose of the burglary was to obtain her PII; (2) an actual injury; or (3)
that she actually suffered identity theft. Id. at *5; see also Key v. DSW, Inc., 454
F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (denying standing where an unauthorized
access of customer PII occurred but plaintiff failed to allege that a third party
intended to use her financial information or steal her identity).
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suits, following the reasoning of several non-data breach sister
circuit court opinions.93 Consequently, the court found that a
mere increased risk of harm was a cognizable injury sufficient to
confer standing.94
On October 6, 2010, the Ninth Circuit in Krottner v.
Starbucks Corporation95 took Pisciotta’s lead.96 In Krottner,
thieves stole a laptop from a Starbucks location containing
unencrypted names, social security numbers, and addresses of
over 97,000 employees.97 Plaintiffs were former Starbucks
employees.98 Starbucks notified all affected employees and
advised them to monitor their credit as a precautionary
measure.99 Starbucks further provided one year of free credit
monitoring service.100 Plaintiffs’ standing argument relied on the
substantial amount of time and money spent to monitor their
credit and the additional expenses that would arise after their
complimentary credit monitoring expired.101 One plaintiff further
alleged that there was an unauthorized attempt in December
2008 to open a new bank account with his social security
93. See Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting, in dicta, that exposure to toxic substances could establish a risk of
future harm sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact); Sutton v. St. Jude Med.
S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a defective medical
implant creates a increased risk of future harm sufficient to establish a
cognizable injury); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938,
947–48 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that possible future injury is sufficient to confer
standing with regard to environmental harm); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that
increased risk of environmental harm is a cognizable injury sufficient to confer
standing).
94. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or
by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm
that the plaintiff would’ve otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.”).
95. 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
96. See id. at 1140 (conferring Article III standing, but ultimately affirming
the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s state-law claims).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1141.
100. See id. (providing free credit monitoring even where Starbucks had no
indication that the information was misused).
101. See id. (listing mitigation measures such as placing fraud alerts on
credit cards and spending extra time monitoring 401(k) accounts).
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number.102 None of the plaintiffs suffered any financial loss in the
form of identity theft.103
The Ninth Circuit found that one plaintiff’s “generalized
anxiety and stress” allegations were the only present injuries
alleged.104 These conferred standing for only one plaintiff.105 With
regard to the plaintiffs’ future harms and mitigation argument,
the court—much like Pisciotta—relied on Century Delta Water
Agency v. United States.106 It analogized an increased risk of
identity theft to proposed governmental action creating a
substantial risk of future harm in the environmental context.107
Finding Pisciotta persuasive, the court established its own
immediate injury standard: There is an injury-in-fact “if a
plaintiff faces a ‘credible threat of harm,’108 the harm being ‘both
real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”109 The court
found that the laptop theft created credible threat of real and
imminent harm; most importantly, the court found that the
harms were not conjectural or hypothetical—i.e. not speculative—
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1142. Standing requires a plaintiff to show harm; an injury to one
party does not grant standing to the entire class. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“[T]he plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury
in fact’ . . . .” (emphasis added)). “The ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an
injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured.” Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
105. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010)
(relying on Supreme Court precedent to grant standing for anxiety caused by
the potentially “‘devastating’ consequences” surrounding a possible disclosure of
Social Security numbers (quoting Doe v. Chan, 540 U.S. 614, 617–18 (2004))).
106. See 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he possibility of future injury
may be sufficient to confer standing . . . threatened injury constitutes ‘injury in
fact.’”).
107. See id. at 948 (finding standing for plaintiff farmers who established a
substantial risk of their crops being destroyed by new governmental initiatives
altering discharge of water from a reservoir). The court also analogized to cases
of exposure to toxic chemicals where defendants failed to provide medical
screening. See Pritikin v. Dept’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791,796–97 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding that defendant’s failure to pay for plaintiff’s medical screening after
their exposure to toxic substances created a sufficient injury in fact).
108. See generally Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 950
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding standing where there was a substantial risk of
irreparable environmental damage).
109. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (requiring a plaintiff
to show a high degree of immediacy to confer standing).

78

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 61 (2016)

because the laptop was already stolen.110 Therefore, to the Ninth
Circuit, theft of a laptop containing unencrypted PII created an
imminent injury sufficient to confer standing. Until 2011, it
appeared that similarly situated data breach victims had their
foot in the door.111
And then came Reilly v. Ceridian Corporation.112 On
December 12, 2011, the Third Circuit filed its Reilly decision,
denying standing and distinguishing itself from Pisciotta and
Krottner.113 The court followed an extremely restrictive standard
that would deny standing in almost all data breach suits relying
on imminent injury.114 In Reilly, plaintiffs were Brach Eichler law
firm (the Firm) employees.115 The Firm was one of defendant
Ceridian’s—a payroll-processing firm—clients.116 In December
2009, unknown hackers infiltrated Ceridian, potentially gaining
access to customer PII.117 It was inconclusive whether the
hackers actually read, understood, or copied the data.118 Ceridian
sent letters to its customers informing them of their potential risk
of identity theft and provided them with one year of free credit
monitoring.119 As a result, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against
Ceridian alleging an increased risk of identity theft, credit
110. See Krottner, 628 F.3d at 948 (noting that, if the laptop had not been
stolen and plaintiffs alleged an increased risk of future theft, the claim would be
“far less credible”).
111. The Ninth Circuit followed Pisciotta’s reasoning in reaching an
identical conclusion earlier that same year. See Ruiz v. Gap, 380 F. App’x 689,
691 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming the lower court in granting standing where
thieves stole a laptop containing 750,000 job applicants’’ PII). At the district
court level, it was unclear whether the laptops were stolen for their data or for
their intrinsic value. Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (N.D. Cal.
2009). Regardless, the court was persuaded by Pisciotta and district court
precedent. See id. (granting standing for increased risk of future harm
regardless of the thief’s intentions (citing Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster &
Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))).
112. 664 F.3d 38 (3rd Cir. 2011).
113. See id. at 44 (criticizing Pisciotta and Krottner’s standing analyses).
114. See id. at 43 (finding that injuries relying on actions by unknown third
parties were too speculative to be considered imminent).
115. Id. at 40.
116. Id.
117. See id. (noting that the stolen PII included first and last names, social
security numbers, and in some cases, birthdays and bank account numbers).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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monitoring costs to mitigate the alleged risk, and emotional
distress.120
The Third Circuit denied standing on the plaintiffs’ increased
risk of identity theft argument for three reasons. First, the
plaintiffs’ standing theory relied on a speculative chain of events,
thereby failing to show an injury with a high degree of
immediacy.121 To the court, the fact that hacker had to read and
understand the PII, intend to use it to the plaintiffs’ detriment,
and actually make unauthorized harmful transactions created an
impermissible level of speculation.122 The court could not find an
explanation for any future injury without beginning with the
word “if” and, as such, found the injury to be too speculative.123
Second, the court found the plaintiffs’ reliance on Pisciotta and
Krottner unpersuasive.124 This was predominantly because the
plaintiffs in the present case neither pleaded a “sophisticated,
intentional and malicious”125 intrusion nor alleged any misuse of
their PII—i.e. no actual injury.126
Third, persuaded by district courts, the court refuted
Pisciotta’s constitutional standing analysis altogether and
distinguished the present case from Krottner.127 In discrediting
the Pisciotta analysis, the court determined that Pisciotta
120. Id.
121. See id. at 42 (mandating the immediacy requirement as essential to
preventing the court from ruling on an injury that may never occur (citing Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992))).
122. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3rd Cir. 2011) (requiring
this chain of events to produce an injury before plaintiffs had standing,
therefore, effectively eliminating imminent injury as an option for data breach
plaintiffs).
123. See id. at 43 (emphasizing that that, in a prior case, the court denied
standing because plaintiffs could not allege how they “will be injured without
beginning the explanation with the word ‘if’” (quoting Storino v. Borough of
Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 297–98 (2003))).
124. See id. at 44 (distinguishing the circumstances between the present
case and Pisciotta and Krottner).
125. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007)
(finding standard).
126. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding standing).
127. See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d. 1046, 1051–53
(E.D. Mo. 2009) (ruling that the risk of future harm posed by future data theft
in which the harm may occur is too speculative); Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp.
2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (same).
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incorrectly analogized data breach to toxic torts, defective
medical devices, and environmental harm.128 Importantly, in the
court’s eyes, injury already occurred in medical-device and toxic
exposure cases.129 The court opined that the only question left in
such cases is to what extent or how the injury will manifest,
whereas in data breach, the plaintiff’s status quo has not
changed.130 Also, data breach cases do not “hinge on human
health concerns.”131 The court notes a clear distinction and
accompanying willingness for courts to confer standing when
human injury may occur rather than mere monetary harm.132 The
court also discounted the environmental harm analogy because
monetary compensation cannot repair environmental damage,
but it can make a credit fraud victim whole.133 It reasoned that
mere monetary damages could be recouped once incurred and the
calculations could be more precise.134 But, before any damages
occurred, they were entirely speculative.135
Finding that the harms were purely speculative, the court
determined that the plaintiffs’ resulting mitigation costs did not

128. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3rd Cir. 2011) (discussing
the Pisciotta court’s failure to address the “imminent” and “certainly impending”
requirements altogether).
129. See Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting, in dicta, that exposure to toxic substances could establish a risk of
future harm sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact); Sutton v. St. Jude Med.
S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a defective medical
implant creates a increased risk of future harm sufficient to establish a
cognizable injury).
130. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45 (noting that any future harm is not
quantifiable in data breach, whereas in toxic torts, a significantly heightened
risk of bodily harm is imminent). In Reilly, the plaintiff’s status was the same as
if the breach never occurred. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. (“The deceased, after all, have little use for compensation. This
case implicates none of these concerns.”).
133. See id. (recognizing that monetary damages may not be adequate in the
context of environmental harm (citing Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United
States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2002))).
134. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44–46 (3rd Cir. 2011) (failing
to recognize that injuries occurring several years after a breach would be
increasingly difficult to trace to the defendants).
135. See id. (noting that the identity theft may never occur and speculating
what damages may occur cannot be accurately calculated).
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result from a cognizable injury-in-fact.136 The court found that
mitigation costs “protect[ing] against an alleged increased risk of
identity theft [are] not enough to demonstrate a concrete and
particularized or actual or imminent injury.”137 Because plaintiffs’
mitigation costs were not incurred in fear of a certainly
impending injury, the costs were no more an actual injury than
the alleged future harms.138 To the Reilly court, an impermissible
level of speculation exists between the hackers viewing private
PII and hackers actually using it to a plaintiff’s detriment.
Fortunately, the First Circuit at least set a minimum
threshold requirement. In 2012, the First Circuit in Katz v.
Pershing, LLC139 recognized a common thread among the circuits:
hackers actually accessed the data in all three cases.140 The court
acknowledged access to data as the very minimum and as such,
denied standing where the plaintiff claimed an increased risk of
access to her PII.141 In Katz, the plaintiff argued that the
defendant’s investment services, which gave “end users”
unfettered access to her PII, left it inadequately protected.142
These end users were people, such as investment consultants,
working for the customers’ benefit.143 The court implicitly limited
Pisciotta’s generalized increased risk of harm standard when it
denied standing.144 While Katz recognized Pisciotta’s, Krottner’s,

136. See id. at 46 (finding that mitigation costs incurred by the plaintiffs’
reliance on a speculative or hypothetical harm were done merely to ease their
fears and not a reasonable response to the given circumstances).
137. Id. (internal citations omitted).
138. See id. (“[Plaintiffs] prophylactically spent money to ease fears of future
third-party criminality. Such misuse is only speculative—not imminent.”).
139. 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012).
140. See id. at 80 (reading Pisciotta, Krottner, and Reilly to require, at a very
minimum, that a plaintiff plead actual unauthorized access to PII). “In each of
the[se cases], the plaintiffs’ data actually had been accessed by one or more
unauthorized third parties.” Id.
141. See id. (“[T]he plaintiff alleges only that there is an increased risk that
someone might access her data and that this unauthorized access (if it occurs)
will increase the risk of identity theft and other inauspicious
consequences . . . . This omission is fatal . . . .”).
142. Id. at 70.
143. Id. at 69.
144. See id. (requiring actual access, the court implicitly tightened
Pisciotta’s extremely broad standard). Recall, Pisciotta states that “the injury-
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and Reilly’s inconsistencies, its import is clear: at a bare
minimum, the plaintiff needed to plead unauthorized access to
her PII.
B. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
On February 26, 2013, the Supreme Court announced
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,145 a seminal case on
Article III standing that some courts interpret as the modern test
for imminent injury.146 In Clapper, the Court found that the
plaintiffs’ allegation of future harms and the ensuing mitigation
costs were based on a chain of events too speculative to be
considered “certainly impending.”147 The plaintiffs were attorneys
and human rights organizations148 working with clients that, they
argued, were likely targets of surveillance under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act (the
Act).149 The Act grants the Executive Branch the authority to
intercept foreign communications.150 Plaintiffs, without any proof
of the government intercepting their communications, sought a
in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act
which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the
plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.” Pisciotta v.
Old Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). The
plaintiff arguably would have satisfied Pisciotta’s concededly loose standard.
145. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
146. See infra Parts V (arguing that this is an inappropriate interpretation).
147. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013). See
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (“Allegations of possible future
injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art. III. A threatened injury must be
‘certainly impending’ to constitute injury in fact.” (citing Babbitt v. Farm
Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979))).
148. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1145 (noting that plaintiffs clients are located
in areas likely to be targeted by FISA).
149. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1885(c) (2012) (authorizing and regulating certain governmental electronic
surveillance of communications for foreign intelligence purposes).
150. FISA permits the President, through the Attorney General, to
“authorize electronic surveillance . . . solely directed at . . . the acquisition
of . . . communications used exclusively between or among foreign powers.” Id.
§ 1802(a). The Attorney General must obtain the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court’s approval. Id. § 1881(g). The Act permits “the targeting of
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire
foreign intelligence information.” Id. § 1881(a).
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declaration finding § 1881a unconstitutional and permanently
enjoining against its use.151 The plaintiffs claimed that § 1881a of
the Act “compromise[d] their ability to locate witnesses, cultivate
sources, obtain information, and communicate confidential
information to their clients.”152 The plaintiffs further claimed that
the Act forced them to incur considerable expenses traveling to
their clients to communicate in person.153
The plaintiffs raised two standing theories: (1) there was an
“objectively reasonable likelihood” an injury would occur because
their communications would be intercepted in the future;154 and
(2) the risk of surveillance under the Act was so substantial that
the mitigation costs incurred to prevent it “constitute [a] present
injury . . . fairly traceable to § 1881a.”155
The district court denied standing.156 The only issue on
appeal to the Second Circuit was whether the plaintiffs could
legally assert their claims in federal court.157 The Second Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision, finding an “objectively
reasonable likelihood” that the plaintiffs’ future communications
would be intercepted “at some time in the future.”158 The court
further found that the plaintiffs suffered present injuries

151. The entirety of the plaintiffs’ complaint sought “(1) a declaration that
§1881a, on its face, violates the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment,
Article III, and separation-of-powers principles and (2) a permanent injunction
against the use of §1881a.” Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146.
152. Id. at 1145.
153. See id. at 1145–46 (characterizing the plaintiffs mitigation efforts to
“protect the confidentiality of sensitive communications” as “costly and
burdensome”).
154. Id. at 1146. The Court also found the Second Circuit’s standard too lax
to satisfy traditional standing requirements. See id. at 1141 (“[T]he Second
Circuit's “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard is inconsistent with this
Court's “threatened injury” requirement.”).
155. Id. at 1146.
156. See Amnesty Int’l U.S. v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding “fear of surveillance” to be an “abstract fear” and
therefore, insufficient to confer standing). The court also denied the plaintiffs’
standing for mitigation costs incurred resulting from the alleged fear of
surveillance. Id. at 652.
157. See Amnesty Int’l U.S. v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2011)
(noting that the court was not answering the question of whether the claims
were valid).
158. Id. at 118.
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stemming from the reasonable fear of future harm.159 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer two specific
questions: whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing to
challenge the constitutionality of § 1881a and whether it should
permanently enjoin the government from authorizing
surveillance under § 1881a.160
Importantly, the Court applied an elevated standing
inquiry.161 This “especially rigorous” standing inquiry applies
where a dispute forces the Court to decide on the constitutionality
of Executive or Legislative action.162 The Court has traditionally
denied standing in cases involving government actions in federal
intelligence gathering.163 With this heightened standard in mind,
the Court analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims of future harms and
mitigation costs, which relied on possible actions by the
Legislative and Executive Branches.164
The Court considered several factors.165 First, the plaintiffs
provided no evidence of intercepted communications under the
159. See id. at 138 (“Because standing may be based on a reasonable fear of
future injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury, and the plaintiffs have
established that they have a reasonable fear of injury and have incurred costs to
avoid it, we agree that they have standing.”).
160. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013)
(discussing whether plaintiffs claim of future harm could be classified as
“certainly impending” (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))).
161. See id. at 1147 (acknowledging that Article III standing serves as a
check on the judiciary “to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp
the powers of the political branches” (citations omitted)); infra Part III.C
(discussing cases where this critical distinction was ignored).
162. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142 (justifying the Court’s rigorous review
to prevent the expansion of judicial power in cases affecting the separation of
powers).
163. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (finding that
plaintiffs needed more than “generalized grievances” to establish standing when
contesting a statute permitting the Central Intelligence Agency to account for
its expenditures solely on the certificate of the CIA Director); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1974) (requiring the
plaintiffs to actually be harmed to have standing to challenge the Armed Forces
Reserve membership of Members of Congress); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15–
16 (1972) (finding fear of surveillance insufficient to confer standing to challenge
an Army intelligence-gathering program).
164. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (stating that the Court traditionally
does not confer standing when the decision would review the actions of other
political branches).
165. The plaintiffs needed to either establish an actual harm or allege a
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Act.166 The plaintiffs merely claimed that the Act would harm
them in the future.167 Second, the plaintiffs’ theory for future
harms relied on a speculative chain of events.168 A series of five
events needed to occur before the plaintiffs’ confidential
communications were intercepted: (1) the government must
choose to target plaintiffs’ clients;169 (2) the government must opt
for surveillance under § 1881a;170 (3) the judge serving on the
Foreign Surveillance Court must find the government’s request
satisfactory in light of the requirements under §1881a;171 (4) the
government must succeed in actually acquiring the plaintiffs’
contacts’ communications;172 and (5) the plaintiffs must be parties
harm that was certainly impending. See supra Part II (discussing these
requirements as the constitutional minimum).
166. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (noting
that the plaintiffs filed suit on the day when the Act was passed—they were not
yet harmed).
167. Plaintiffs’ claim relied largely on the assumption (with little knowledge
as to the government’s targeting practices) that government officials would
target their clients under § 1881a. See id. at 1148 (relying on assumptions that
communications may be intercepted in an attempt to classify mitigation costs as
harms sufficient to confer standing).
168. The Whitmore Court implicitly accepted that imminence claims require
a certain degree of speculation; however, certain claims are too speculative. See
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157 (U.S. 1990) (finding, under Arkansas’
comparative review of death penalty sentencing, that a sentencing for a mass
murderer was not similar enough to that of a robbery-murder to create an
imminent injury—any injury was “too speculative”).
169. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148–49 (2013) (finding that, because the
plaintiffs have no “actual knowledge of the Government’s targeting practices,”
they, at best, could “merely speculate and make assumptions about whether
their communications” would be intercepted). Article III standing cannot rest on
“‘mere allegations,’ but must be ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific
facts.’” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The
plaintiffs had no knowledge of the government’s practices, and therefore, they
could not provide—nor had they provided—concrete evidence that their clients
would be targeted. See id. at 1149 (finding that plaintiffs’ lack of knowledge
regarding governmental discretion under the Act can only lead to speculation).
170. See id. at 1149 (finding that, even if plaintiffs could prove that
interception of their communications was imminent, they would not be able to
trace them back to the Act, thereby failing the “fairly traceable” prong for
Article III standing).
171. See id. at 1150 (“[R]espondents can only speculate as to whether that
court will authorize such surveillance.”); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(f)–(g) (2012) (establishing guidelines for compliance and
certification requirements).
172. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013) (noting
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to the intercepted communications.173 Based on this speculative
chain of events, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ injuries were
neither certainly impending nor fairly traceable to the Act.174
The speculative chain of events proved fatal to plaintiffs’
second theory for standing.175 The Court dismissed the plaintiffs’
argument that the Act created ongoing injuries requiring the
plaintiffs to undertake costly mitigation measures.176 The Court
refused to follow the Second Circuit’s “relaxed reasonableness
standard.”177 As a result, it found that mitigation costs must stem
from a certainly impending threat.178 Because the threat was not
certainly impending, the mitigation costs were not a “reasonable
reaction to a risk of harm.”179 Therefore, without a certainly
impending threat, the mitigation costs were merely an attempt to
“manufacture standing” rather than an actual injury.180
Essentially, dismissal of the plaintiffs’ first argument181
proved fatal to the second.182 The Court found that any alleged
that the Government’s efforts to intercept plaintiffs’ communications is not
guaranteed).
173. See id. (determining that plaintiffs could only “speculate as to whether
their own communications with their foreign contacts would incidentally be
acquired”).
174. The Court, however, acknowledged that plaintiffs can establish
standing if there is a “substantial risk” that harm will occur. Id. at 1150 n.5
(citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754–55 (2010)).
Plaintiffs “fall short of even that standard.” Id.
175. See id. at 1151 (finding that mitigation costs not related to an imminent
injury are insufficient to confer standing).
176. See id. (denying standing because plaintiffs inflicted harm upon
themselves without the presence of a certainly impending threat).
177. See id. at 1148 (refusing to follow the Second Circuit’s “objectively
reasonable likelihood” theory because it was too loose and, therefore,
inconsistent with the requirement that “‘threatened injury must be certainly
impending to constitute injury in fact.’” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 158 (1990))).
178. See id. (finding that, because the threat was found not to be certainly
impending, the mitigation costs were merely the result of an unwarranted fear
of surveillance and, therefore, insufficient to confer standing).
179. Id. at 1151.
180. See id. (noting that, because the threat was too speculative to be
considered certainly impending, plaintiffs’ mitigation costs were unreasonable
and insufficient to establish standing (citing Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426
U.S. 660, 664 (1976))).
181. See id. at 1146 (arguing that an injury would occur because there was
an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications would be
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future harm relied on a speculative chain of events and concluded
that the alleged injury was not certainly impending.183 Mitigation
costs cannot stem from a hypothetical future harm.184 Therefore,
the Court found that the plaintiffs used mitigation costs as a way
to manufacture standing.185
C. The District Courts Follow Suit
Many district courts interpret Clapper as a large hurdle for
data breach claims relying on imminent injury;186 others interpret
Clapper to tighten constitutional standing altogether.187 While
Clapper was concerned with the narrow and constitutionally
sensitive subject of foreign surveillance under FISA, courts have
applied it to a broad range of standing issues, including data
breach cases.188

intercepted in the future).
182. See id. (arguing that the risk of surveillance under the Act was so
substantial that the mitigation costs incurred to prevent it “constitute [a]
present injury that is fairly traceable to § 1881a”). The Court concluded that
“allowing respondents to bring th[e] action based on costs they incurred in
response to a speculative threat would be tantamount to accepting a repackaged
version of respondent’s first failed theory of standing.” Id. at 1151.
183. See id. at 1143 (“[R]espondents’ theory of future injury is too
speculative to satisfy the well-established requirement that threatened injury
must be ‘certainly impending.’” (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158
(1990))).
184. See id. (noting that, if standing could be based on mitigation costs
extending from a hypothetical future harm, a plaintiff could merely purchase a
plane ticket and have standing to sue).
185. See id. (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing by choosing to
make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly
impending.”).
186. See, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data
Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (following Clapper correctly,
finding that “there were simply too many ‘ifs’ involved before an injury came to
pass”).
187. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 655
(S.D. Ohio 2014) (discarding past data breach precedent in light of Clapper,
essentially foreclosing any imminence claim for data breach victims).
188. See infra notes 189–247 (discussing the cases that interpret Clapper as
a virtual ban on imminent injury in data breach case law).
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On September 3, 2013, the Northern District of Illinois, in In
re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litigation,189 properly applying
Clapper, denied standing where the plaintiffs suffered no actual
injury from pin pad “skimming” at sixty three of defendant’s
stores.190 The plaintiffs argued an increased risk of identity theft,
resulting anxiety, emotional distress, as well as mitigation
costs.191 The court noted the potential market for the stolen credit
card numbers, recognizing that some could be sold for as little as
$1.50 or as much as $90.00.192 The court found that the plaintiffs
failed to plead concrete facts showing actual harm.193
Interestingly, the court did not find an actual injury even where a
plaintiff faced a reimbursed fraudulent charge; it believed that
the only way a defendant could suffer an actual injury was
though an “unreimbursed charge on her credit card.”194 Here, she
only claimed loss of credit card use and it was not directly
apparent whether any unauthorized charges were related to the
breach.195
The court, citing Clapper, denied the plaintiffs’ alleged
increased risk of identity theft and mitigation cost claims.196 The
plaintiffs could not prove that their information was actually
stolen; therefore, the claim was more akin to increased risk of
189. No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013).
190. See id. at *2–3 (describing “skimming” as the process of reading and
extracting temporarily stored credit card data from physical in-store pin pads
used by customers to make payments).
191. See id. at *7–12. (finding that these claims did not satisfy the certainly
impending standard reaffirmed in Clapper). Importantly, the court noted
Clapper’s recognition of a less rigorous standing inquiry. See Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013) (“[W]e have found standing
based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”).
192. Barnes & Noble Pin Pad, No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *4.
193. Id. at *8 (finding that loss of credit card use was not an actual injury).
194. Id. at *16 (emphasis added).
195. Id. Without proving that hackers actually accessed the data, it becomes
increasingly difficult to trace the plaintiffs’ injuries to the pin pad skimming.
See id. at *12 (denying any actual injury because the plaintiffs did not plead the
necessary facts to establish that their PII was stolen).
196. Id. at *11–12. As we saw in Katz, plaintiffs cannot allege an increased
risk of access; a legitimate imminence theory requires at least access to PII. See
Katz v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (reading the Seventh Circuit’s
increased risk of harm theory to exclude an increased risk of access that would
later lead to possible future harm).
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access rather than harm.197 Accordingly, the inherent speculation
also discredited the plaintiffs’ mitigation argument.198 The court’s
hesitation to grant standing based on Clapper was justified;
unlike a network breach, it is difficult to show that the plaintiff
used the particular pin pad that was targeted. So, even if the
plaintiffs shopped in an affected store, future harm would rely on
proof that the particular pin pad was hacked.199 But, much to the
chagrin of data breach victims, other district courts deny
standing even when hackers have possession of the PII.200
On February 10, 2014, the Southern District of Ohio in
Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company201 interpreted
Clapper as heightening the imminence standard for data breach
plaintiffs. The facts are familiar: the plaintiffs gave their PII—
such as names, addresses, social security numbers—to apply for
insurance, then the network containing this information was
hacked.202 Defendant insurance company, which provided one
year of free credit monitoring, instructed the plaintiffs to monitor
their credit, and suggested they freeze their credit cards at their
own expense.203 The plaintiffs’ PII was neither misused nor were
their identities stolen.204 Among other claims, the plaintiffs

197. See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL
4759588, *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013) (“Plaintiffs ‘cannot manufacture standing
by incurring costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.’” (citing Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013))). It is important to note that
the pin pad skimming must have occurred in person at the store; this was not a
hacking of a network. Id. at *2–3. The plaintiffs did not allege that the
particular store they shopped at was breached; they were merely “customers
during the time when the skimming occurred.” Id. at *3.
198. See id. at *11–12 (denying mitigation costs because they were not in
response to an imminent harm).
199. See id. at *2 (creating a high level of speculation because the plaintiffs’
argument assumed that, out of Barnes and Nobles’ 700 stores, the thieves
“skimmed” the particular pin pad that they used).
200. See infra notes 201–244 and accompanying text (discussing cases
interpreting Clapper to essentially foreclose any imminence argument in the
data-breach context).
201. 998 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 10, 2014).
202. Id. at 650.
203. See id. (admitting that the plaintiffs’ information was actually stolen
and disseminated).
204. Id.
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alleged increased risk of harm—including identity theft, identity
fraud, or medical fraud—and associated mitigation costs.205
The court denied standing, finding the plaintiffs’ position
similar to that of respondents’ in Clapper and refused to follow
Pisciotta and Krottner.206 Importantly, the court conceded that
the hackers might have the plaintiffs’ PII in their possession;
however, it misinterpreted Clapper, finding that all claims
relying on third-party behavior as speculative.207 The court
opined that any future harm was contingent on the actions of
third parties and therefore, speculative.208 However, the Clapper
Court was reluctant to pass judgment on actions taken by
government actors in light of an “especially rigorous” standing
inquiry.209 Clapper is not a complete ban on standing, especially
when hackers have possession of plaintiffs’ PII. The only step left
for plaintiffs to be injured is actual identity theft, credit fraud,
etc.210

205. See id. at 651 (citing Pisciotta’s standard as applicable and analogous to
their case).
206. See supra notes 84–110 and accompanying text (finding an increased
risk of future injury or real and immediate threat of future harm sufficient to
confer standing where laptops containing plaintiffs’ PII were stolen).
207. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (S.D.
Ohio 2014) (“Named Plaintiffs received a letter from Defendant indicating that
on October 23, 2012, thieves hacked into a portion of Defendant’s computer
network and that their PII was stolen and disseminated as part of the theft.”
(emphasis added)).
208. See id. at 655 (“[T]he Supreme Court is reluctant to find standing
where the injury-in-fact depends on the actions of independent decision-makers
as the injury in those circumstances is speculative.” (citing Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1141 (2013))).
209. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1141 (2013)
(applying this heightened standard in light of separation-of-powers concerns).
210. The Adobe and Remijas courts apply this very reasoning. See Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Grp, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that, once
data thieves obtained unencrypted customer data, victims should not have to
wait for an actual injury to occur before having standing to sue—the breach
created a “substantial risk” of future identity theft); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy
Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (“[R]equir[ing]
Plaintiffs to wait until they actually suffer identity theft or credit card
fraud . . . would run counter to the well-established principle that harm need not
have already occurred or be ‘literally certain’ in order to constitute injury-infact.”).
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Most importantly, the court did not follow circuit precedent—
Pisciotta, Krottner, and Ruiz v. Gap211—because of Clapper. The
court stated that these cases “were decided prior to Clapper . . . .
[Which] specifically rejected the idea that an injury is certainly
impending if there is an ‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ it will
occur.”212 It essentially saw the objectively reasonable likelihood
standard as synonymous with the Ninth Circuit’s increased risk
of future harm standard and, as such, found that Clapper
overruled it.213 The court determined that “the increased risk of
harm may satisfy the [Ninth Circuit’s] standards, but under
Clapper, more is required to show an injury is certainly
impending.”214
In sum, the court took Clapper to reject the Ninth Circuit’s
increased risk of future harm standard and chose to follow
Reilly215 and several district courts.216 Because the harm was not
imminent, the mitigation costs were based on speculation, and
therefore, they were merely a way to “manufacture standing.”217
However, not all courts apply Clapper with a broad brush, and
the next case exemplifies the tension between existing data
breach case law and Clapper’s reiteration of the certainly
impending standard.

211. 380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010). For a brief discussion on Ruiz, see
supra note 111 (finding standing where laptops containing PII were stolen).
212. Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 656 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
213. See id. at 654 (interpreting Clapper’s overruling of the Second Circuit’s
“objectively reasonable likelihood” standard to foreclose any future injury that is
not certainly impending).
214. See id. at 656 (discounting Krottner’s standing requirement as too loose
in light of Clapper).
215. The court’s reliance on Reilly is improper as well. In Reilly, there was
no indication that the plaintiffs’ information was even stolen or viewed, whereas
here, defendants conceded that the plaintiffs’ PII was in fact stolen. See Galaria
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“[T]heir
PII was stolen and disseminated as part of the theft.”).
216. See id. at 657 (“[T]he Court finds persuasive the reasoning in the line of
cases rejecting risk of harm as an injury-in-fact in the context of data
breaches.”).
217. See id. (“‘[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing merely by
inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm
that is not certainly impending.” (citing Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013))).
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“[T]he import of Clapper for standing analysis in the Seventh
Circuit . . . is a question on which reasonable minds may
differ.”218 Relegated to a footnote, the Northern District of Illinois
in Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc.219 not only acknowledged
Clapper’s special circumstances, but also recognized the
substantial risk standard.220 It did not, however, place enough
emphasis on Clapper’s difficult constitutional context.221 The
Strautins court dealt with a large-scale breach of South
Carolina’s Department of Revenue; the allegations were against
the
employed
data-security
service—Trustwave—for
an
“imminent, immediate and continuing increased risk of identity
theft and identity fraud.”222 The defendants announced that some
taxpayers were potentially compromised and provided free
services to determine if the plaintiffs in particular were
affected.223 The plaintiff neither received notice that her data was
compromise nor did she take advantage of the free services.224
The court correctly dismissed for lack of standing, and it is easy
to see why.225 However, the same conclusion could have arguably
been reached applying Pisciotta.226
218. Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 878 n.11
(N.D. Ill. 2014). As we will see, the Seventh Circuit in Remijas provides the
answer. See infra Part IV (limiting Clapper to the narrow context of theories of
future injury relying on the actions of independent government actors).
219. 27 F. Supp. 3d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
220. See id. at 878 n.11 (acknowledging that standing formulations vary and
that the court has in the past applied less rigorous standards in different
contexts).
221. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (“The
law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles,
serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the
political branches.”).
222. See Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 874 (noting, importantly, that South
Carolina provided a website helping users find out if they were affected and also
offered free credit monitoring and a lifetime of credit resolutions).
223. See id. (“[T]he state set up a website and toll-free hotline for taxpayers
to determine if their data was compromised.”).
224. See id. (“Strautins admits that she . . . never used the website.”).
225. South Carolina provided an online service to determine if a taxpayer’s
specific PII was in fact compromised. Id. The plaintiffs did not use the online
service and could not prove that their particular PII was even compromised. Id.
226. The plaintiff’s entire argument relied solely on the fact that because
she was once a taxpayer in South Carolina, then her PII must have been stolen.
Id. at 880. The court found, however, that the breach “did not result in the
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As a district court in the Seventh Circuit, however, the court
found that Clapper completely overruled Pisciotta.227 The court
felt “duty bound” to follow Clapper because both cases involved
“potential unauthorized disclosure of sensitive personal
information.”228 Ultimately, the court found that standing was
not the controlling issue because Strautins “failed even to
plausibly allege that her PII was stolen.”229 This is significant
because the court could have left Pisciotta entirely untouched, but
it instead it boldly asserted that Clapper overruled the
established Seventh Circuit precedent for data breach suits.230
Clapper’s unique set of facts should not, however, be
construed to disqualify its application entirely. Clapper denies
standing where future injury relies on a truly speculative chain
were to occur.231 A highly speculative chain of events, under
Clapper, should overcome a plaintiff’s future injury claim.232 On
compromise of data of all taxpayers filing . . . since 1998.” Id. at 881 (emphasis
added). Even applying the increased risk of future injury standard in Pisciotta,
the plaintiff provided no evidence to show that she is part of the class affected
by the breach. See id. at 874 (emphasizing that the plaintiff neither received a
notice that her information was stolen nor did she check the South Carolina
website). The plaintiff’s case certainly would not satisfy Katz. See supra notes
139–144 and accompanying text (noting Katz required the plaintiff to at least
show access to her PII).
227. See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 878
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper seems rather plainly to reject the premise, implicit in
Pisciotta . . . that any marginal increase in risk is sufficient to confer
standing.”).
228. Id. at 879. The Strautins court failed to consider the distinct difference
between the two cases. See infra Part V.A.1 (urging that Clapper was not a data
breach case and its application in the data breach context should be limited).
229. See Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 879 n.11 (finding that the plaintiff
“failed to establish even the proposition that she is at an increased risk of
identity theft” (emphasis added)). While the court did not cite to it, this is the
exact application of the First Circuit baseline standard. See Katz v. Pershing,
672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (denying standing for increased risk of access).
230. See Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 879 n.11 (“[T]his Court cannot square
[Pisciotta] with Clapper.”). The court likened the Second Circuit’s “objectively
reasonable likelihood” standard to Pisciotta’s “increased risk of harm.” Id.
Because Clapper explicitly declined to follow the Second Circuit standard as too
loose, the court believed that it must have also overruled Pisciotta’s standard.
Id.
231. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013)
(“[R]espondents’ argument rests on their highly speculative fear . . . .”).
232. Imminence theories relying on speculative chains of events have
traditionally been dismissed for lack of standing; Clapper was merely following
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May 9, 2014, the District Court for the District of Columbia in In
re Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Backup
Tape Data Theft Litigation233 did just that. SAIC is an
information technology company that handles data for the federal
government.234 In what appeared to be a typical car theft, a SAIC
employee’s car was broken into and the thief stole the stereo, GPS
system, and several data tapes.235 Those data tapes, however,
contained the PII—including medical records—of 4.7 million
military members.236 Plaintiff military members argued that an
increased risk of harm alone was sufficient to establish
standing.237 The court, relying on Clapper, dismissed the cases
because of the highly speculative chain of events required before
any injury transpired or the data was even accessed.238
As in Clapper, the increased risk of future identity theft was
truly speculative. Assuming that the person who stole the tapes
was just a run-of-the-mill car thief, he would have to:
(1) recognize that the tapes contained computer readable PII, as
opposed to what would be found in a typical car tape-deck;
(2) find a data-tape reader and connect it to his computer;
(3) download software to upload the tapes—or otherwise, slowly
spool it through similar cassettes to obtain the data; (4) decrypt
the portions of encrypted data; (5) acquire familiarity with the
database format, and; (6) misuse or sell it.239 The fact that the
tapes could either be in a landfill or fully uploaded to the thief’s
computer was simply too speculative to constitute an increased
threat of identity theft, let alone a certainly impending injury.240
precedent. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1990)
(denying standing where a plaintiffs injury relied on obtaining habeas relief, a
retrial, a reconviction, and a death sentence).
233. 45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014).
234. Id. at 19. The tapes contained only personal information and no credit
card numbers. Id. at 20.
235. See id. (implying that the thieves most likely stole the tapes for their
intrinsic value rather than for their information).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 25 (finding plaintiffs’ argument, that they were 9.5 times
more likely to become victims of identity theft, unpersuasive in light of Clapper
because Clapper requires more than an increased risk of harm).
239. Id.
240. See id. at 25–26 (implicitly focusing on the fact that the burglars, more
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However, after correctly applying Clapper for speculation,
the court interpreted Clapper to completely reject the increased
risk theory in data breach cases.241 The court discounted preClapper sister circuit court precedent—Pisciotta, Krottner, and
Ruiz—as “thinly reasoned.”242 As evidence, it specifically stated
that the Strautins and Galaria courts, among others, “have been
even more emphatic in rejecting ‘increased risk’ as a theory of
standing in data-breach cases.”243 But, Strautins and Galaria
applied Clapper with far too broad of a brush, failing to limit its
application to highly speculative chains of events and government
action.244
D. Not so Fast, Clapper
Other courts read Clapper for what it really was. Notably, on
January 21, 2014, the Southern District of California in In re
Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation245 found standing after a large-scale criminal intrusion
into Sony’s online gaming network.246 The network contained
customers’ names, email and mailing addresses, birth dates,
credit and debit card information—including security codes, full
numbers, and expiration dates—and login information.247 Being
in the Ninth Circuit, the court considered Clapper’s effect on
standing and, most importantly, Krottner’s viability.

likely than not, did not steal the tapes for their contents).
241. See id. at 25 (“That increased risk, they maintain, in and of itself
confers standing. But as Clapper makes clear, that is not true. The degree by
which the risk of harm has increased is irrelevant—instead, the question is
whether the harm is certainly impending.”).
242. Id. at 28. Without providing a reason, the court merely cited Pisciotta,
Ruiz, Krottner, and Century Delta in passing, treating their reasoning as per se
incorrect in light of Clapper. Id.
243. Id. (internal citation omitted).
244. See supra notes 201–230 and accompanying text (discussing how these
courts have misinterpreted Clapper to overrule prior data breach precedent
where the hackers had immediate access to the plaintiffs’ PII—i.e., the only step
left was for the hacker to use the PII to the detriment of the plaintiffs).
245. 996 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
246. See id. at 955 (conceding that millions of users’ PII was stolen).
247. Id. at 954.

96

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 61 (2016)

Defendants argued that Clapper tightened Krottner’s injuryin-fact analysis.248 The court did not agree. It found no reason to
interpret Clapper as altering, let alone tightening, constitutional
standing requirements.249 By using the term “certainly
impending” instead of “real and immediate,” the court opined that
the Supreme Court did not establish a new standing
framework.250 The court found that motions to dismiss were
routinely denied where the plaintiff alleges the collection and
wrongful disclosure of PII.251 Most importantly, the court found
that Krottner and Clapper only require that plaintiffs “plausibly
allege[] a credible threat of impending harm based on the
disclosure of their Personal Information following the intrusion”
to survive a motion to dismiss.252 Actual access to the plaintiffs’
personal information need not be alleged.253
“Clapper did not change the law governing Article III
standing,” said the Northern District of California later that
same year.254 On September 4, 2014, the court in In re Adobe

248. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
that plaintiffs needed “a credible threat of harm” that was “both real and
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical” to satisfy standing for future
harms).
249. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Lit.,
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that the Supreme Court
merely reiterated traditional standing requirements elicited in Whitmore).
250. See id. (interpreting the “certainly impending” and the “real and
immediate” standards as one in the same because the Supreme Court merely
applied long established standing requirements); see also Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990) (referring to “real and immediate” and
“certainly impending” within the same analysis).
251. See Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 961; see also, e.g., In re
Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711–12 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding
standing—through a statutory violation—where defendants transmitted to
advertisers the identities and the URL of the webpage being viewed when
plaintiffs clicked an the advertisement); Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d
1102, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding standing because there was a real and
immediate threat that the plaintiffs’ private information would continue to be
disclosed).
252. Id. at 962.
253. See id. (finding that neither Krottner nor Clapper require plaintiffs to
allege actual access to their personal information, and that only a credible
threat of impending harm was required to find standing).
254. In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1213 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
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Systems Privacy Litigation255 found standing and reaffirmed
Krottner’s viability in light of Clapper.256 As in the Sony data
breach, the Adobe network contained customers’ email addresses,
credit card information, bill addresses, names, telephone
numbers, etc.257 The breach here was exactly the type of
“sophisticated, intentional and malicious” intrusion that
compelled the Pisciotta court to find an imminent harm of future
injury.258 The hackers spent several weeks in the database
without detection, decrypting and removing over 38 million
customers’ PII.259 The plaintiffs alleged three cognizable injuries:
“(1) increased risk of future harm; (2) costs to mitigate the risk of
future harm; and/or (3) loss of the value of their Adobe
products.”260
Adobe was the first court to recognize Clapper’s sensitive
constitutional context.261 It emphasized that Clapper merely
overruled the Second Circuit’s “objectively reasonable likelihood”
standard as too broad.262 It also recognized that the plaintiffs in
Clapper could only speculate whether the governmental actors
would
even
make
the
decision
to
intercept
their
communications.263 Finally, it highlighted the Supreme Court’s
recognition of two separate and distinct standing inquiries; most
importantly, the “substantial risk” standard.264 Given Clapper’s
255. Id.
256. See id. at 1214 (finding that Clapper and Krottner were not
irreconcilable).
257. Id. at 1206.
258. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007)
(focusing on the nature of the cyber attack).
259. Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1206.
260. Id. at 1211.
261. See id. (emphasizing that the sensitive constitutional context in
Clapper called for an “unusually rigorous” standing inquiry (citing Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013))).
262. See id. at 1214 (“Clapper merely held that the Second Circuit had
strayed from these well-established standing principles by accepting a toospeculative theory of future injury.”).
263. See id. at 1213 (noting that, in Clapper, the government would have to
decide to target plaintiffs’ client’s communications, choose to invoke their
authority under the particular challenged statute, and have an Article III judge
decide the constitutionality of the surveillance before any action was taken).
264. See id. (referring to footnote 5 of Clapper in which the Court recognized
the existence of the “substantial risk” standard (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
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limited scope, the court found Krottner and Clapper
reconcilable.265 The court placed little emphasis on Krottner’s
alternative language, finding Krottner’s phrasing more similar to
Clapper’s “certainly impending” than to the Second Circuit’s
“objectively reasonably likelihood.”266 As such, the court found
standing under Krottner.267
Interestingly, the court not only reaffirmed Krottner’s
viability, but it also found standing under Clapper as well.268 In
its opinion, the plaintiffs’ risk of their PII being misused was
“immediate and very real.”269 The court focused on the fact that
the hackers deliberately targeted Adobe’s servers, spent several
weeks collecting customer PII, and that the plaintiffs’ PII was in
fact taken during the breach.270 There was no speculation
whether the information was taken.271 In the courts eyes, the
injury could only be more imminent if their PII had already been
misused.272 The court did not believe that plaintiffs should have
to “wait until they actually suffer identity theft . . . to establish
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013))). The court interpreted the substantial
risk standard to permit plaintiffs to reasonably incur mitigation costs if there is
a substantial risk of harm. Id. at 1213.
265. See id. at 1214 (finding that lower courts in the Ninth Circuit have a
duty to reconcile “intervening higher authority” with Ninth Circuit precedent
unless higher authority clearly overrules it).
266. Compare Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir.
2010) (“[I]mmediate danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . . [C]redible
threat of real and immediate harm . . . .”), with Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (“[C]ertainly impending . . . .”). Importantly, the
court failed to notice that Krottner’s “real and immediate” threat test came from
the very case that established the certainly impending requirement. See
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990) (“[T]here is no amount of
evidence that potentially could establish that Whitmore's asserted future injury
is ‘real and immediate.’” (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974))).
This further supports that Krottner’s standard not only is viable, but that it also
works hand in hand with the certainly impending standard.
267. See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1211–12 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (“Adobe does not dispute that Krottner is directly on point.”).
268. See id. at 1214 (“[E]ven if Krottner is no longer good law, the threatened
harm alleged here is sufficiently concrete and imminent to satisfy Clapper.”).
269. Id. at 1215.
270. See id. (expressing the same concern seen in the Pisciotta court with
regard to the nature of the cyber attack).
271. See id. (recognizing that Adobe notified its customers that their
particular PII was accessed).
272. Id.
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IV. The Seventh Circuit Answers the Call
As we have seen, even with similar facts, the circuit courts
addressed the imminent injury issue extremely differently.275
After Clapper—a non-data breach case—several district courts
determined that Clapper not only overruled circuit court data
breach precedent,276 but that it tightened the imminent injury
standard altogether.277 Then came Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Group, LLC278 on July 20, 2015, boldly stating: “Clapper does
not . . . foreclose any use whatsoever of future injuries to support
Article III standing.”279 This makes the Seventh Circuit the first
273. See id. (refusing to wait for an actual injury because it would run
contrary to the established principle that harm need not be “literally certain”
(citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013))).
274. See infra Part IV (discussing the Remijas court’s application of Adobe’s
reasoning).
275. See supra Part III.A (comparing the differences in circuit courts’
treatment of data breach claims).
276. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)
(increased risk of future harm); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139,
1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (credible threat of real and immediate injury).
277. See, e.g., Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 876
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper compels rejection of Strautins' claim that an increased
risk of identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for
standing.”); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d. 646 (S.D. Ohio
2014) (holding that the increased risk of future harm relying on the occurrence
of future criminal actions by independent decision-makers was not imminent or
certainly impending); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617,
2013 WL 4759588, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013) (“The Complaint alleges
Plaintiffs incurred expenses to mitigate an increased risk of identity theft or
fraud, but it does not allege what those expenses are with any specificity. Even
if specific expenses had been alleged, such expenses would not qualify as actual
injuries under Clapper.” (emphasis added)).
278. See Seventh Circuit Denies En Banc Review For Data Breach Class
Action,
HUNTON
&
WILLIAMS
PRIV.
BLOG
(Sept.
29,
2015),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2015/09/29/seventh-circuit-denies-en-bancreview-for-data-breach-class-action/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (discussing the
denial of en banc review for Remijas) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
279. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015).
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post-Clapper circuit court to consider imminent injury in the data
breach context.280
In Remijas, Neiman Marcus sent letters to its customers
disclosing that a data breach exposed potentially 350,000
customer credit cards.281 Importantly, Neiman Marcus offered all
350,000 customers credit monitoring and identity-theft
protection.282 The plaintiffs alleged two imminent injuries: “an
increased risk of future fraudulent charges and greater
susceptibility to identity theft.”283 The court found that those
plaintiffs claiming actual identity theft alleged a cognizable
injury-in-fact.284
“At this stage in the litigation, it is plausible to infer that the
plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman
Marcus data breach.”285 Importantly, the court distinguished the
case from Clapper because here, Neiman Marcus confirmed the
breach,286 whereas in Clapper, the plaintiffs only suspected that

280. Its decision caused a ripple effect in the district courts. See Antman v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01175-LB, 2015 WL 6123054, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 19, 2015) (citing Remijas and Adobe in confirming the continuing viability
of Krottner’s “credible, real, and immediate” future injury test). The court
applied Adobe and Remijas’ reasoning to limit Clapper. Id.; see also In re
SuperValu, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2592, *15 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016)
(distinguishing Remijas and Adobe, arguing that they apply only where there is
clear access and misuse to the PII); Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., No. 14-CV7006 (JS)(ARL), 2015 WL 9462108, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015) (“But one
critical distinction in [Remijas] is that 9,200 of those customers experienced
fraudulent charges following the breach.”); Conrad v. Boiron, Inc., 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 152981 (“There must be at least a substantial risk of future harm
to the named plaintiff.” (citing Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693));
281. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690 (noting that “9,200 of those 350,000
exposed credit cards” were already used fraudulently).
282. Id. Ironically, offering this protection hurt the defendant’s case because
the court reasoned that they would not have provided credit monitoring if the
risk was “so ephemeral that it [could] safely be disregarded.” Id. at 694.
283. Id. at 692.
284. See id. (conferring standing even though those plaintiffs actually
injured had been reimbursed, finding that with identity theft comes lost time
and additional expenses to pursue relief and “sort things out”).
285. Id. at 693 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150
n.5 (2013) (acknowledging the “substantial risk of harm” standard and implying
that it is a lesser standard than “certainly impending”).
286. See id. at 694 (“Neiman Marcus does not contest the fact that the initial
breach took place.”).
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their communications would be intercepted.287 In Remijas, there
was no doubt that the information was stolen and its contents
were clear.288 As such, the court found that future injury was
imminent.289 Second, with regard to traceability, it acknowledged
an issue particularly relevant to any data breach plaintiff’s claim
of future harm;290 the longer a plaintiff “wait[s] for the threatened
harm to materialize,” the stronger a defendant’s traceability
defense becomes.291 Nor did defendant’s argument—that any
alleged future injuries may arise from other breaches—convince
the court that the claim was not fairly traceable to Neiman
Marcus.292
Third, the court acknowledged the obvious reality inherent in
any targeted data breach.293 All along, courts should have been
asking the question—as the Remijas court wisely did—“Why else
would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’
private information . . . . [If not] to [eventually] make fraudulent

287. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013)
(“[R]espondents’ theory necessarily rests on their assertion that the Government
will target other individuals—namely, their foreign contacts. Yet respondents
have no actual knowledge of the Government’s §1881a targeting practices.”
(emphasis added)).
288. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015) (conceding that 350,000 credit cards were potentially exposed).
289. The nature of the attack, the access to PII, and the free credit
monitoring all persuaded the court that there was a substantial risk of future
harm and that the mitigation costs were, therefore, in response to an imminent
harm. Id. at 694.
290. Recall that an injury must “be fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
291. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (citing In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66
F. Supp. 3d. 1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). This directly challenges Reilly’s
theory that victims of data breach should sue once the injury materializes. See
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In a data breach
case . . . there is no reason to believe that monetary compensation will not
return plaintiffs to their original position completely—if the hacked information
is actually read, copied, understood, and misused to a plaintiff's detriment.”).
292. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696 (likening the defendant’s argument to
that of Summers v. Tice, in which the court shifted the burden upon the
defendants prove who was responsible (citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88
(1944))).
293. As compared to what appeared to be a typical car burglary in SAIC. See
supra notes 231–244 (discussing the SAIC court’s correct application of
Clapper).
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charges or assume those consumers’ identity[?]”294Guided by the
obvious answer, the court found the plaintiffs’ substantial risk of
harm plausible.295
Finally, with regard to mitigation costs incurred, the court’s
answer once again appears to follow common sense. The court
reasoned that, once a consumer hears that her credit card was
stolen, purchasing credit protection is not an unreasonable
response.296 Also, the price of credit protection, such as Experian,
is around $19.95 per month after the first month; a cost the court
calls “more than de minimis.”297 The court found that mitigation
expenses were a valid actual injury in response to the substantial
risk of harm.298
V. In Light of Remijas, Courts Should Confer Standing for
Victims of Targeted Data Breaches
This Note does not argue that any loss of data creates an
imminent injury. Rather, it only argues that Clapper did not
change preexisting standing requirements and that it has been
incorrectly interpreted to deny standing for otherwise legitimate
claims. Clapper left the circuit court data breach opinions—
Pisciotta and Krottner—intact because they permit an allowable
level of speculation inherent in any imminent injury claim. To
determine Clapper’s proper application, we must consider the
level of speculation involved;299 the circumstances surrounding a
294. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015).
295. See id. (referring to additional government data showing that hackers
may wait up to a year before using the information illegally or that the
information may be sold or posted on the Internet, leaving open the possibility
that fraudulent use of the information could last for years).
296. Especially in light of the fact that Neiman Marcus offered to provide
free credit protection to anyone who shopped in their stores in between January
2013 and January 2014. Id. at 694.
297. Id.
298. See id. (analogizing to the First Circuit in Anderson v. Hannaford Bros.
Co., in which the court found standing where the “plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
mitigation expenses—namely, the fees for replacement cards and monitoring
expenses . . . [even though] the harm [was] not physical”).
299. See infra Part V.B (discussing the speculation inherent in all imminent
injury claims and limiting Clapper’s application to true speculation).
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data breach;300 and the applicable standing inquiry.301 These
elements are critical to Clapper’s proper application.
A. The “Certainly Impending” Standard Remains Unchanged
Recall that Clapper was a government surveillance case that
reaffirmed the “well-established requirement that a future injury
must be ‘certainly impending.’”302 In reality, the import of the
Court’s decision is very narrow. First, the Court found the Second
Circuit’s loose and “novel” “objectively reasonable likelihood”
standard inconsistent with the certainly impending standard.”303
It did not purport to heighten the standing inquiry nor did it
discard the substantial risk standard.304 Second, it found that
plaintiffs cannot establish standing based on costs incurred
mitigating highly speculative future harm—i.e. “manufactur[ing]
standing.”305 Third, it reaffirmed that heightened judicial
scrutiny applies where courts are forced to speculate into the
hypothetical actions of independent government actors.306
1. Clapper is a Scalpel, Not a Wrecking Ball
The proposition that, “under Clapper, more is required to
show an injury is certainly impending”307 is patently incorrect.308
300. See infra Part V.A (distinguishing between malicious targeted cyber
attacks directed towards data servers and coincidental data thefts).
301. See infra Part V.C (discussing whether to apply the “certainly
impending” or “substantial risk” standards in determining imminence).
302. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).
303. See id. (invalidating the Second Circuit’s “novel view of standing”).
304. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015) (“[Clapper] did not jettison the ‘substantial risk’ standard.” (internal
citation omitted)); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1213
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (“The Supreme Court did not overrule any precedent, nor did it
reformulate the familiar standing requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability.”).
305. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143 (finding that incurring mitigation costs
based on a non-imminent harm would permit plaintiffs to essentially purchase
their way into court).
306. Id. at 1141.
307. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 656 (S.D.
Ohio 2014) (interpreting Clapper as heightening standing altogether).

104

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 61 (2016)

In Clapper, the Court did not heighten the certainly impending
standard; it was simply not met.309 The alleged harm failed to
satisfy even the less stringent substantial risk standard.310 If it
could not satisfy this lesser standard, it follows that the certainly
impending inquiry would fail as well—let alone an allegedly
heightened standard.311 Therefore, there would be no reason for
the Court to raise the standard if the baseline was not even
satisfied. It logically follows that the standard was not raised;
rather, it simply was not met because of the high degree of
speculation.312 Therefore, if the certainly impending standard has
been heightened, its application must be limited to future harm
contingent on speculative decisions of independent government
actors.313
Furthermore, Clapper was not a data breach case. The Court
neither discussed data breach case law nor did it question
Krottner’s standard.314 Clapper merely concluded that the Second
Circuit’s “objectively reasonably likelihood” standard deviated

308. Clapper could not have purported to heighten the standard because the
chain of events did not even satisfy the substantial risk standard. It was truly
speculative regardless of the standard applied.
309. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (finding
the plaintiffs argument too speculative).
310. See id. at 1150 n.5 (“But to the extent that the ‘substantial risk’
standard is relevant and is distinct from the ‘certainly impending’ requirement,
respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of the attenuated chain of
inferences necessary to find harm here.”).
311. See id. (implying that the substantial risk of future harm standard is
less demanding than the certainly impending standard).
312. The speculation coupled with the Court’s separation-of-powers concern
left the plaintiffs’ case doomed from the start. See id. at 1144–45 (recognizing
that the plaintiffs’ case presented a constitutional challenge to a government
surveillance statute “subject to congressional oversight and several types of
Executive Branch review”).
313. In this scenario, prior circuit court precedent must co-exist with
Clapper. See, e.g., Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We hold
that the issues decided by the higher court need not be identical in order to be
controlling. Rather, the relevant court of last resort must have undercut the
theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that
the cases are clearly irreconcilable.”).
314. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding standing because the court found that the plaintiffs were in
“immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury,” alleging a “credible threat
of real and immediate harm”).
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from traditional standing law.315 Regardless, Krottner’s standard
is more closely worded to Clapper’s “certainly impending”
standard than the “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard.316
As the Adobe court found, this similarity, coupled with Clapper’s
lack of intent to alter standing law, reaffirmed Krottner’s
viability.317
2. Speculation and Third-Party Action
Clapper reaffirms the established principle that too much
speculation sounds the death knell for any imminence claim.318
Clapper does not stand for the proposition that any speculation
effectively topples a certainly impending imminent injury
claim.319 Once a hacker has unfettered access to PII, a future
injury is not highly speculative; injury is the final step.320
Speculation is inherent in any theory of imminent injury.321 The
315. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (finding
the Second Circuit’s imminence standard too loose to satisfy the traditional
certainly impending standard).
316. See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (determining that a slight change in Krottner’s word usage did not
create a test separate and distinct from Clapper’s certainly impending
standard). This is likely because “real and immediate” and “certainly
impending” both came from the same case. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
154–60 (1990).
317. See id. (considering Krottner’s different word usage as insubstantial,
arguing that its standard was more in line with Clapper).
318. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 157 (acknowledging that imminent injury
cases require certain at least some speculation).
319. Or for that matter, a claim relying on a substantial risk of future harm.
320. See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (“[T]he threatened injury here could
be more imminent only if Plaintiffs could allege that their stolen personal
information had already been misused.”). But see Galaria v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (discrediting the plaintiffs
imminence theory as speculative in light of Clapper even after hackers accessed
the plaintiffs data).
321. This is not a novel position and is readily accepted in non-data breach
case law. For example, in cases involving exposure to toxic substances, there is
speculation whether the harm will materialize and to what degree. See Denney
v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting, in dicta, that
exposure to toxic substances could establish a risk of future harm sufficient to
constitute an injury-in-fact). In medical malpractice suits, the harm has either
already occurred or it is imminent. While a botched procedure may statistically
lead to problems in the future, it is never certain until it materializes. See
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Clapper Court expressly stated that future harm is not required
to be “literally certain.”322 Conversely, this suggests that standing
permits a certain degree of speculation.
Concededly, the Clapper plaintiffs’ alleged future injury was
speculative regardless of the standard applied.323 This is a far cry
from the common scenario where the only remaining step is to
use a consumer’s PII fraudulently.324 Speculation is minimal
where hackers have unfettered access to stolen PII, especially
after a sophisticated attack.325 The Galaria court, for example,
incorrectly considered future harm relying on any third-party
action as speculative.326 Citing Clapper, the Galaria court denied
standing because the plaintiffs’ theory relied on “the actions of
independent decision makers.”327 Clapper’s import, with regard to
independent actors, is far more limited.328 The Clapper Court
applied this reasoning to the government context because of the

Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
that a defective medical implant creates a increased risk of future harm
sufficient to establish a cognizable injury).
322. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013)
(implying that both the certainly impending and the substantial risk of future
harm standards allow for certain degrees of speculation).
323. Recall that the plaintiffs’ clients would need to be selected for targeting,
they would need to be targeted under the particular statute in question, the
Foreign International Surveillance Court would need to authorize the
surveillance, and the surveillance would need to be successful. Clapper, 133 S.
Ct. at 1148.
324. See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (recognizing that the minimal speculation required once the data is
stolen).
325. See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the particularly high risk of harm
resulting from an organized infiltration of a data network).
326. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 655 (S.D.
Ohio 2014) (interpreting Clapper to deny standing where future harm relied on
actions by any independent parties, failing to recognize Clapper’s rigorous
standing inquiry in the context of independent governmental decision makers).
327. See id. (taking Clapper’s emphasis on independent decision makers out
of context (citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1141))). According to the court, any
alleged injury is “contingent on what, if anything . . . third party criminals do
with th[e] information.” Id.
328. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144–45 (2013)
(noting that § 1881a was subject to congressional and Executive Branch review,
and subject to Fourth Amendment limitations where independent judges
determined the constitutionality of any proposed foreign surveillance).
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separation-of-powers concern.329 It was not intended to foreclose
any future harm contingent on the actions of non-governmental
third parties.330
B. The Nature of Data Breach and Ease of Access to Stolen
Information
The circumstances surrounding a breach are particularly
relevant in determining whether Clapper applies and the nature
of the speculation involved.331 As we have seen, one can hardly
call a car burglary a “data breach” merely because a data tape
happened to be stolen along with other valuable electronic
equipment.332 A targeted attack on a corporation’s data server,
however, is another story. The theft of a laptop containing
unencrypted PII requires its own and different considerations. If
the criminal does not intend to steal data but a physical theft
results in unfettered access, this raises a future injury towards
certainly impending.333 As such, the nature of the breach and the
329. When the Court claimed its traditional reluctance to speculate into the
actions of independent decision makers, it cited Whitmore and Lujan, both
requiring speculation into the actions of governmental actors. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (“When the suit is one
challenging the legality of government action or inaction . . . .” (emphasis
added)); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1990) (“It is just not
possible for a litigant to prove in advance that the judicial system will lead to
any particular result in his case.” (emphasis added)).
330. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.669, 678 (1973) (granting standing where
plaintiffs alleged that imminent “economic, recreational and aesthetic harm”
would result from the Interstate Commerce Commission’s approval of a railroad
surcharge). The Court further found the alleged harms, even if incorrect,
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss because they may be able to show that
the “string of occurrences alleged would happen immediately.” Id. at 159.
331. See infra notes 332–358 and accompanying text (arguing that
unfettered access to PII, regardless of the thief’s intent, creates a sufficiently
imminent injury).
332. See In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft
Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The tapes could be uploaded onto
her computer and fully deciphered, or they could be lying in a landfill
somewhere in Texas because she trashed them after achieving her main goal of
boosting the car stereo and GPS.”).
333. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 12 (noting that credit card information can
be sold on the internet for around $3.50 per number). Note that, even if the thief
does not have access to the “deep web” market for credit card numbers, he has
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ease of access to PII are particularly relevant considerations
when determining imminence.334
1. The Sophisticated Attack
Some cases conferring standing emphasized the hackers’
specific targeting methods and sophistication when determining
imminence.335 The Pisciotta court emphasized the breach’s
“sophisticated, intentional and malicious” nature;336 Adobe and
Remijas followed suit.337 Recognizing the sophisticated and
calculated nature of a breach is critical to whether an injury is
imminent, but some courts ignore it altogether.338 Rather, they
deny standing even where a defendant concedes that hackers
all the information necessary to make fraudulent charges. See Pierluigi
Paganini, Buying Personal Information in the Deep Web, INFOSEC INST. (Mar.
24, 2015), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/buying-personal-information-inthe-deep-web/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (“The term underground ecosystem is
usually used to refer a collection of forums, websites and chat rooms that are
designed with the specific intent to advantage, streamline and industrialize
criminal activities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
334. See infra Parts V.B.1–2 (differentiating between sophisticated cyber
attacks and physical theft of electronics containing PII, but ultimately
concluding that both instances present an imminent injury where nothing more
is required to access the data).
335. Compare Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631–32 (7th Cir.
2007) (granting standing after a sophisticated and malicious attack on a data
server without considering whether or not the hackers copied or disseminated
the data), In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1206 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (granting standing after hackers breached Adobe’s data network, spent
weeks inside, and removed customer data, all without detection), and Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (granting standing
where hackers potentially gained access to 350,000 consumers’ credit card
information), with Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir.
2010) (granting standing after a laptop containing the unencrypted PII of
thousands of employees was stolen), and Ruiz v. Gap, 380 F. App’x 689, 690 (9th
Cir. 2010) (granting standing after a laptop containing 750,000 unencrypted
employment applications was stolen).
336. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632.
337. See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1214 ([T]he hackers deliberately targeted
Adobe's servers and spent several weeks collecting names . . . .”); Remijas, 794
F.3d at 693 (“[T]he hackers deliberately targeted Neiman Marcus in order to
obtain their credit-card information . . . .”).
338. See supra Parts III.A,C (arguing that Clapper has blinded the courts to
the obvious imminence of future harm after a sophisticated cyber attack).
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possess the plaintiffs PII after a cyber attack.339 Other courts
concede that hackers infiltrated a data system, but refused to
recognize they could have actually saved or read customer PII.340
Hackers, by virtue of their “profession,” possess a specific set
of skills unknown to the layperson.341 Hacking into a data
network, presumably, is done for a specific purpose—to access the
data behind the encryption software.342 Once this data is accessed
and seen by unauthorized eyes, the damage is done—the hackers
have all the information necessary to harm the plaintiffs.343 The
Adobe court found that once data is accessed, the only step left for
a harm to occur is the harm itself.344 Additionally, Remijas noted
that the longer a plaintiff waits to sue, the harder it is to prove
339. See supra Parts III.A,C (discussing the Strautins and Galaria courts’
lack of legitimate consideration of the circumstances surrounding a cyber
attack).
340. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011) (“An
unknown hacker infiltrated Ceridian’s Powerpay system and potentially gained
access to personal and financial information . . . . It is not known whether the
hacker read, copied, or understood the data.” (emphasis added)).
341. See The Essential Skills to Becoming a Hacker, WONDERHOWTO: NULLBYTE (2015), http://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/essential-skills-becomingmaster-hacker-0154509/ (last visited May 12, 2016) (“As the hacker is among
the most skilled information technology disciplines, it requires a wide
knowledge of IT technologies and techniques.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
342. Given the complex set of skills that hacking requires and the degree of
criminal liability involved, hackers capable of breaching a corporate data
network presumably do not do so without intending to see the encrypted
information. See 10 Ways Companies Get Hacked, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://www.cnbc.com/2012/07/06/10-Ways-Companies-Get-Hacked.html
(last
visited May 12, 2016) (identifying sophisticated methods that hackers use to
gain entry into corporate data networks) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
343. We have seen various types of damaging PII stolen throughout this
discussion. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th
Cir. 2015) (credit card information); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp.
3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (same); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No.
12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2013) (same); see also In
re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.
Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (names, addresses, contact information, medical
records); Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40 (personal and financial information); Galaria v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d. 646, 650 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (financial
information, including social security numbers).
344. Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (conferring standing even though any
identity theft relied on actions by third parties).
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traceability.345 In its justification, the Remijas court pointed to
evidence showing that victims of data breach remain exposed for
many years.346 This could lead to identity theft long after free
credit monitoring expires, leaving plaintiffs without a remedy in
court.347 In this light, the conclusion that harm is speculative
after a sophisticated and intentional data breach appears bizarre
to say the least. Yet, some courts interpret Clapper to require
such a result.348
2. The Average Thief’s Windfall
A burglar breaks into a house and among the items he steals
is what appears to be an ordinary laptop. But what happens
when the laptop contains the unencrypted credit card numbers
and personal information of tens of thousands of people?
Admittedly, future harm from theft of an encrypted laptop or
data tape requires highly speculative steps.349 Unlike a
sophisticated cyber attack, the average thief does not have the
skills to decrypt a laptop or read—or even recognize the
significance of—a data tape.350 However, on a decrypted laptop, a
hacker’s ease of access to the data is readily apparent, and the
345. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (bolstering its traceability analysis with the
fact that Neiman Marcus already raised it as a defense).
346. See id. at 694 (“[S]tolen data may be held for up to a year or more
before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been
sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for
years.”).
347. See id. (noting that plaintiffs are left vulnerable to attack for several
years and that it becomes increasingly difficult to trace any damages to the
defendant, especially given the increasing frequency of data breaches).
348. See supra Part III.C (discussing cases that denied standing where
hackers gained access to the particular plaintiffs PII after a sophisticated
breach).
349. Certain levels of speculation are inherent and permitted in any
imminence claim. See supra note 330 (discussing SCRAP—a case cited by
Whitmore when it established the certainly impending standard—where the
court granted standing because the plaintiffs could possibly prove the
immediacy of the alleged injury during trial).
350. See In re Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft
Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying standing based on the
speculative chain of events required to actually read the information on the
stolen data tapes).
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harm is real and immediate.351 As we have seen, with successful
and deliberate targeting comes ease of access to data and the only
remaining step is injury.352 This same immediacy is present were
thief has the valuable PII at his fingertips.353 There is no
speculation whether he will recognize the information for what it
is or that special means must be used to access it.354
C. Reconciling Competing Circuit Standards in Light of a Limited
Clapper
With Clapper properly limited, data breach victims can
establish standing under two theories: (1) the certainly
impending or (2) the substantial risk standards.355 In this
discussion, many theories for standing have come to light from
different circuits.356 Pisciotta was the first circuit to tackle the
issue.357 Analogizing to toxic tort, medical malpractice, and
environmental cases, the court found that an increased risk of

351. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Here, Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged a credible threat of real and
immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their
unencrypted personal data.”); Ruiz v. Gap, 380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010)
(granting standing under Century Delta’s “credible threat of harm” standard
(citing Cent. Delta Agency Water Agency, 306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002)));
Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 2:14-CV-06476, 2015 WL 5729241, at *14 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 30, 2015) (granting standing where plaintiffs suffered actual injuries
stemming from laptop theft).
352. The Sony, Adobe and Remijas courts do not ignore the obvious
implications of a sophisticated data breach. See supra notes 245–298 (conferring
standing where data was accessed after a sophisticated breach).
353. See Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (conferring standing where a thief had
unfettered access to PII).
354. Note in SAIC, the court denied standing because to the average person,
data tapes are not readily recognizable. SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 25. This is
clearly distinguishable from an unencrypted list of PII.
355. See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (finding that the plaintiffs satisfied both Krottner and the certainly
impending standard);
356. See supra Part III (discussing the standards applied in Clapper,
Pisciotta, and Krottner, and how courts have interpreted them).
357. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)
(citing to sister circuit courts in an attempt to analogize toxic tort, medical
malpractice, and environmental harm cases to data breach lawsuits).
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harm was sufficient to confer standing.358 As noted, speculation is
inherent in any imminent injury claim.359 We have seen that
Clapper, properly limited, only forecloses standing theories
relying on a “highly speculative” and “highly attenuated” chain of
events.360 Therefore, where PII is readily accessible to hackers or
identity thieves, the only step remaining is for the harm to
occur.361 It follows that, even if Pisciotta’s standard is more
similar to an “objectively reasonable likelihood,” a substantial
risk of harm still existed and, most likely, the harm was certainly
impending.362
Krottner, following Pisciotta, found standing where the
plaintiffs faced “a credible threat of harm that was both real and
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.”363 Krottner reached
this conclusion through similar analogies to other non-data
breach cases cited in Pisciotta.364 The standard, however, is more
akin to the traditional “certainly impending standard.”365
Krottner, while reiterating that an imminent harm exists, set the
appropriate standard slightly above Pisciotta. This was not a
mere increased risk of harm, rather, the harm was “real and
immediate.”366
358. For cases discussing personal injury, see Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG,
443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th
Cir. 2005). For cases discussing environmental harm, see Cent. Delta Water
Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2002); Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000).
359. See supra Part V.A.2 (discussing allowable levels of speculation in
imminence claims).
360. See supra Part V.A.2 (conceding that Clapper was rightfully decided
given the speculative nature of plaintiffs alleged future injuries).
361. See supra Part V.A.2 (noting that Clapper only rejects imminence
theories that require speculation into the actions of independent governmental
actors).
362. As seen in Adobe—which was decided on similar facts—the court found
that the plaintiffs satisfied the certainly impending requirement. In re Adobe
Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
363. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)
(internal citations omitted).
364. See cases cited supra note 330 (listing toxic tort, medical malpractice,
and environmental cases all granting standing for an increased risk of future
harm).
365. See supra notes 305–307 (likening Krottner’s standard to be more
similar to “certainly impending” than an “objectively reasonable likelihood”).
366. The court noted that, had the plaintiffs alleged future harm from a
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As an aside, it is important to address Reilly’s criticism of
Pisciotta and Krottner’s analogy to toxic tort, medical malpractice,
and environmental cases.367 Reilly appears to stand for the
proposition that, if future identity theft can only be articulated
using the word “if,” it is not imminent.368 But such a reading
leaves no effective method of redressing harms stemming from
data breaches. The court found that, as opposed to someone’s
health or the destruction of a wilderness habitat, the only thing
at stake was money.369 Because monetary damages are
quantifiable at the time of the actual harm, the court argued that
suit should be brought once the injury occurs.370 Given that injury
can occur over one year after a breach371 coupled with the high
frequency of data breaches,372 it would be increasingly difficult to
prove traceability.373
The Adobe court found that harm is certainly impending
where hackers have access to PII.374 In fact, the only way an
future theft of the laptop, then the threat would be “far less credible.” Krottner,
628 F.3d at 1143.
367. See supra notes 127–135 (discussing Reilly’s reliance on the policies
surrounding toxic torts, medical malpractice, and environmental suits and how
the court found them inapplicable in the data breach context).
368. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e
cannot now describe how Appellants will be injured in this case without
beginning our explanation with the word ‘if’ . . . .”).
369. Id. at 45–46.
370. See id. at 45 (“In a data breach case, however, there is no reason to
believe that monetary compensation will not return plaintiffs to their original
position completely . . . .”).
371. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir.
2015) (“[S]tolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to
commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the
Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years.").
372. See Chen, supra note 10 (discussing the rise in identity theft, reporting
that in 2014, there were over 250,000 successful identity thefts in America
alone).
373. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 694 (citing In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F.
Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). In Adobe, the defendant used the
very argument that, as time goes on without injury, it is more and more unlikely
that any future injury was defendants fault. In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66
F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
374. See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (finding Clapper inapplicable because
there was no speculation whether the information was stolen); Remijas, 794
F.3d at 696 (finding that, once data thieves obtained unencrypted customer
data, victims should not have to wait for an actual injury to occur before having
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injury could be more imminent was if the data was already
misused.375 To the court, the only speculation to consider was
whether the plaintiffs’ information had been stolen.376 The court
found that waiting for the injury to occur would run counter to
the proposition that future harm need not be “literally certain.”377
Interestingly, the Remijas court used Adobe’s “real and
immediate harm”—which came from Krottner—to satisfy the
“substantial risk” standard acknowledged in Clapper. The court
found that the “deliberate targeting” evidenced an “immediate
and very real” threat that was not “highly attenuated” and
“highly speculative.”378 The court correctly interpreted Clapper
only to foreclose high levels of speculation.
The Pisciotta, Adobe, and Remijas interpretations all have
one element in common; they find standing where a network was
deliberately targeted.379 They also tend to show that, at
minimum, a targeted breach satisfies the “substantial risk”
standard.380 While Pisciotta’s reasoning would not likely survive
today, its similarity to more recent cases shows that the
plaintiff’s claim would survive under a substantial risk of
harm.381 Krottner’s reasoning, on the other hand, applies to the
context where stolen data is readily available regardless of the
thief’s intent to steal PII.382 Even without a clear and deliberate
targeting of PII, immediate access to data presents a “real and
standing to sue—the breach created a “substantial risk” of future identity theft).
375. See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215.
376. See id. (comparing the present case to Clapper where there was no
evidence that the communications had been, or would be, monitored under the
specific statute).
377. See id. (requiring the plaintiffs to wait for an injury to occur would
essentially render any imminent injury standard superfluous (citing Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013))).
378. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015).
379. See cases cited supra note 335 (comparing deliberate and accidental
theft cases).
380. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (conferring standing where plausibly pled
a substantial risk of future harm).
381. See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (conferring standing on similar facts).
382. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)
(applying a slightly reworded version of the certainly impending standard—the
standard that many post-Clapper use to deny standing in identical situations).
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immediate” threat of future harm.383 Readily accessible PII leaves
thieves in the same position as hackers after an intentional
attack; in both scenarios, the only “speculation” left is for the
injury to occur.384 In light of a properly limited Clapper, that
neither overruled the substantial risk standard nor raised the
certainly impending standard, data breach plaintiffs have an
imminent harm sufficient to confer standing.
VI. Conclusion
Remijas, as the first circuit to consider imminent injury in
data breach after Clapper, legitimately reopens the door for
victims. Clapper shows no signs of heightening the certainly
impending requirement. It absolutely does not call for toppling
imminent injury claims when the only “speculative” act is the
harm itself. Furthermore, Clapper was neither a data breach case
nor did it consider the circuit precedent for standing in data
breach case law. It merely applied the certainly impending
standard and found that it was not satisfied. This outcome was
proper given the highly attenuated and highly speculative chain
of events.
Clapper stands to maintain the traditional certainly
impending standing requirement at its proper level—a highly
speculative chain of events effectively defeating a claim of
imminent injury. Likewise, it reaffirmed the legitimate judicial
wariness involved when a theory of future harm speculates into
the actions of independent governmental actors. The Court’s
heightened scrutiny exemplified this caution, noting its
reluctance to pass judgment on speculative future actions of the
two other government branches.
In this light, Remijas took Clapper for exactly what it was. It
was not a bar to imminent injury claims flowing from data
breaches. In fact, it does not apply at all. Injury is imminent
when a thief has access to PII, whether acquiring it was
intentional or not. A victim should not have to wait until the
injury occurs. Given the minimal speculation involved, the
383. See Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (finding Krottner’s “real and
immediate” very similar to “certainly impending”).
384. Id.
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presence of a ready market for PII, and the ease of credit card
fraud, there is a substantial risk for future harm (if the harm is
not certainly impending). Clapper neither forecloses this
conclusion nor should it be interpreted to do so.

